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ABSTRACT
In Chile, the Criminal Code bans all forms of abortion. Fur-
thermore, the Constitution—drafted and enacted by the Military
Junta led by General Augusto Pinochet—was inspired by a conserva-
tive version of Catholic natural law championed by prominent Chil-
ean constitutional law scholars. This Article traces the emergence,
development, and ultimately the defeat of a persistent legal mobili-
zation driven by natural law-inspired litigants, politicians, and
scholars against levonorgestrel-based emergency contraception, also
known as the morning-after pill. In their decade-long efforts at legal
mobilization, these natural law litigants used every tool of the Chil-
ean legal system to challenge the legality and the constitutionality of
the morning-after pill. This case of legal mobilization demonstrates
both the strengths and the weaknesses of conservative political and
religious networks in Latin America, and it demonstrates both the
potential and limitations of litigation-led policymaking in civil law
countries.
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INTRODUCTION: NATURAL LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHILE
Does natural law play any role in contemporary legal systems? What is
the destiny of reproductive rights in Catholic societies? Are courts viable
outlets for channeling political conflicts in so-called civil law countries? And
can judges have the last word on any issue when there is no stare decisis?
This Article addresses these questions by studying the legal struggles sur-
rounding emergency contraception in Chile. As a result of the complete ban
on abortion,1 the legality of the so-called morning-after pill became a hot-
button issue for almost an entire decade. Between 2001 and 2010, a group
of litigants and politicians led a legal mobilization against emergency con-
traception.2 Over the course of a decade, the conservative crusade against
1. The 1874 Criminal Code, which is still in force, punishes both women and physi-
cians for willful abortions. CÓDIGO PENAL [CÓD. PEN.] arts. 342–345 (Chile). Be-
tween 1931 and 1989, however, therapeutic abortion was sanctioned by the Public
Health Code, which only required “the informed opinion of two surgeons.”
CÓDIGO SANITARIO [CÓD. SANIT.] art. 119 (Chile). The Military Junta amended
this law through Statute Nº 18.826, of September 15, 1989, whose only article
established that “[n]o action will be performed whose aim is to cause an abortion.”
Law No. 18.826, Septiembre 15, 1989, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). In addition
to that, the 1855 Civil Code decrees in its Article 75 that “[t]he law protects the life
of those about to be born,” enabling a judge, “on [his] own motion or at the request
of anyone, [to] take all the measures that he deems necessary to protect the existence
of the unborn, when he thinks that it is endangered in any form.” CÓDIGO CIVIL
[CÓD. CIV.] art. 75 (Chile). Finally, the 1980 Constitution, also enacted by the
Military Junta, guarantees “[t]he right to life and to the physical and psychological
integrity of persons,” adding that “[t]he law protects the life of those about to be
born.” CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [C.P.]. art. 19(1).
Throughout the Article, all translations of texts originally in Spanish are provided by
the author.
2. By “legal mobilization,” I mean a sustained deployment of legal strategies and other
complementary actions in the public sphere against or in favor of a certain policy.
The concept is close to those of “adversarial legalism” and “cause lawyering.” Kagan
has defined adversarial legalism as “policymaking, policy implementation, and dis-
pute resolution by means of lawyer-dominated litigation.” ROBERT A. KAGAN, AD-
VERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3 (2001). The difference of
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emergency contraception used recursos de protección (constitutional rights in-
junctions), nulidades de derecho público (public law annulments), requer-
imientos de inconstitucionalidad (concrete constitutional review), and even
the threat of consumer-law lawsuits in their attempts to get rid of the morn-
ing-after pill. And yet, despite using practically every tool that the Chilean
legal system provided for challenging the legality and the constitutionality
of the morning-after pill, and despite being successful in most of their law-
suits, these crusaders ultimately failed to achieve their objective. Public op-
position to the 2008 Constitutional Tribunal’s ban on the pill, including
the first-ever massive protest in Chile against a judicial ruling, created the
political conditions for the enactment of a statute declaring the legality of
this drug and guaranteeing access to it, putting an end to this decade-long
struggle.
In the study of law and politics, there is always a danger of focusing
too much on the pronouncements of courts, and therefore neglecting the
surrounding context that accounts for the “judicialization” of politics and
its resulting “juristocracy.”3 This risk becomes much more pronounced
when trying to understand judicial engagement in policy making within
civil law countries which, at least in theory, rely on legislation rather than
case law for the development of the legal system. In civil law countries,
where the division of labor between legislatures and courts makes “adver-
sarial legalism” and “cause lawyering” much more difficult, there are fewer
examples of this kind of committed legal mobilization; as a result, the phe-
nomenon remains much less studied in this context.4 Lastly, while constitu-
legal mobilization, as I use it here in contrast to adversarial legalism, is that the
former does not necessarily entail the existence of a settled (if controversial) practice
of policy making constructed around litigation, which is precisely what Kagan de-
scribes. Sarat and Scheingold characterize cause lawyering as an activity that is “fre-
quently directed at altering some aspect of the social, economic, and political status
quo.” Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMIT-
MENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 3, 4 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Sche-
ingold eds., 1998). Unlike cause lawyering so defined, legal mobilization does not
necessarily represent a rebellious contestation of the status quo; in this case, in fact,
the conservative lawyers who waged legal war against emergency contraception were
not only deeply tied to the Chilean structures of power and prestige, but also they
were opposing the introduction of a new technique—the morning-after pill—in the
Chilean public health system.
3. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder, Line
Schjolden & Alan Angell eds., 2005); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY:
THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
4. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an Understand-
ing of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE LAWYER-
ING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note
2, at 31, 35, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/
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tional analysts commonly pay copious attention to the supply-side of
conservative legal action, particularly in the form of “originalist” constitu-
tional rulings, the study of the demand-side of conservative legal action
seems much less visible in the literature.5
In this Introduction, I give basic information about Chilean legal cul-
ture and its natural law thread. In Part I, I flesh out the natural law element
of Chilean legal culture by analyzing the stories of the leaders of the legal
mobilization against the morning-after pill. In Parts II and III, I follow their
litigation’s trajectory up through the hierarchy of the Judiciary,6 culminat-
ing in decisions by the special body entrusted with the adjudication of con-
stitutional disputes among the branches of government, the Constitutional
Tribunal.7 In Part IV, I illuminate the legislative response to the Tribunal’s
The_Causes_of_Cause_Lawyering.pdf (“The organization of the state and of legal
regimes also affects how cause lawyering can be expressed. For example, civil law
systems allow fewer litigated challenges to rules.”).
5. Notable exceptions are STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (Ira Katznelson et al. ser.
eds., 2008), and Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential
Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV.
2070 (2009). However, I am reluctant to use Teles’ concept of a “conservative legal
movement” to describe the Chilean case. The phenomenon studied by Teles typically
has permanent organizations and personnel that, while retaining institutional and
personal connections to political parties, are dedicated full-time to legal advocacy
work. In other words, the “conservative legal movement” is an institutionalized phe-
nomenon, relatively autonomous from the groups acting in the electoral and legisla-
tive domains. Instead, we have seen that in Chile the anti-pill litigants are not only
actively involved in politics, but also occasionally appear to use their advocacy as a
way to gain power within the Right. None of them is devoted to legal advocacy in a
full-time capacity. Their networks are not primarily, much less exclusively, oriented
towards legal advocacy. Legal advocacy has been just one tool among many to pro-
mote their agenda. My choice of the term “mobilization,” which suggests an occa-
sional event, instead of “movement,” which indicates the existence of an
organization, seeks to manifest this difference.
6. In Chile, the structure of the Judiciary is similar to the structure of federal courts in
the United States: it includes courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and a Su-
preme Court. The latter, however, lacks competence in disputes between the Presi-
dency and Congress regarding their constitutional powers, which are entrusted to a
Constitutional Court. For more on the Constitutional Court, see note 7.
7. C.P. ch. 7 (Chile) (establishing the Constitutional Tribunal). Chile follows what
Tushnet calls the “German model” of constitutional adjudication, centered on a spe-
cialized constitutional court. As Tushnet puts it, “Hans Kelsen, the jurisprude and
constitutional scholar who designed and then served on the first Austrian constitu-
tional court, argued that a specialized constitutional court would better understand
the political component of constitutional law than would judges who dealt with
ordinary (and in Kelsen’s view, largely nonpolitical) law.” MARK TUSHNET, WEAK
COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 n.4 (2008).
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anti-pill rulings. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this
case for understanding the future of reproductive rights in Chile and Latin
America in general.
Chilean legal culture and its transformations provide helpful context
for understanding the two main jurisprudential strands that we will find
among the decisions adjudicating morning-after pill trials. They can be suc-
cinctly described as a legalistic self-restraint on the one hand, and a value-
laden constitutional activism on the other. These two approaches have roots
in different interpretive attitudes, which have distinct origins within Chil-
ean legal history.
Lisa Hilbink has observed that, in the 1830s, the founding elite of
Chile sought to permanently exclude judges from policy making through
institutional and ideological mechanisms.8 Their clearest legacy is in Chile’s
Civil Code, which asserts that only the legislature can explain or interpret
the law in a generally binding way and that judicial rulings have no value as
precedent.9 Under these circumstances it is not surprising that political and
social struggles have been historically channeled through the legislative pro-
cess.10 Predictably, Chilean internal legal culture11 has been traditionally
characterized as “legalistic” and “positivistic.” These adjectives suggest that
its legal professionals tend to analyze and interpret the law in a textualist
and formalist way, that its judges are self-restrained and deferential towards
the political process, and that the overall legal culture is averse to innovative
interpretations of the law.12 In sum, the historical structure and culture of
the Chilean legal system make legal mobilization a rare occurrence in
Chile.13
8. LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP:
LESSONS FROM CHILE 37 (Chris Arup et al. ser. eds., 2007).
9. CÓD. CIV. art. 3 (Chile).
10. See Julio Faúndez, Chilean Constitutionalism Before Allende: Legality Without Courts,
29 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 34 (2010).
11. Friedman distinguishes between external legal culture, “the legal culture of the gen-
eral population,” and internal legal culture, “the legal culture of those members of
society who perform specialized legal tasks.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 223 (1975).
12. See generally Edmundo Fuenzalida Faivovich, Law and Legal Culture in Chile,
1974–1999, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: LATIN AMERICA
AND LATIN EUROPE 108 (Lawrence Friedman & Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds.,
2003); JULIO FAÚNDEZ, DEMOCRATIZATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND LEGALITY:
CHILE, 1831–1973  (James Dunkerley ser. ed., 2007); HILBINK, supra note 8, at
166–76.
13. Before anti-pill litigation, the most significant example of legal mobilization was the
use of courts to challenge human rights violations under Pinochet. In the last two
decades, a few moral and sociopolitical struggles have been the objects of attempts at
legal mobilization. They include the effort by conservatives to use courts to uphold
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The 1980 Constitution, enacted by the Military Junta led by General
Augusto Pinochet,14 transformed Chile’s legal culture to serve the political
agenda of the Junta and its civil allies. They created new constitutional rem-
edies for the protection of rights considered valuable by Catholics (life) and
neoliberals (property and economic freedom). The new Constitution rein-
forced these protections. It granted individuals the right to seek injunctions
to enforce certain constitutional rights, and gave jurisdiction to grant these
injunctions to the Appellate and Supreme Courts.15 It also created a strong
Constitutional Tribunal entrusted with the constitutional review of legisla-
tion.16 But the Constitution reflected the neoliberal agenda through its un-
balanced protection of constitutional rights; it reserved injunctions for the
protection of property rights and economic freedoms, excluding from its
scope socio-economic rights such as the right to healthcare and to social
security and the right of workers to strike.17 The Constitutional Tribunal,
meanwhile, was entrusted with reviewing whether new legislation con-
formed to the substantive and procedural constraints the Junta wrote into
the Constitution—a mandate that the Court has almost always followed. As
a consequence, the 1980 Constitution forced the courts to confront and
resolve issues that previously were left to the political process. And yet, the
history of fundamental rights under the 1980 Constitution has been sum-
the ban over the film The Last Temptation of the Christ in the nineties and the contes-
tation by progressives of a ruling by the Supreme Court that deprived a lesbian
mother of tuition for her daughters. These two cases resulted in rulings by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. See Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile (“The Last Tempta-
tion of Christ” Case), Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 73 (Feb. 5, 2001); Atala Riffo & Daughters v. Chile, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24,
2012). Because of its decade-long efforts, its proponents’ persistence in using all
available judicial procedures, and its capacity to influence the political and legislative
agenda, the conservative crusade against emergency contraception stands out as the
most important example of Chilean legal mobilization.
14. General Augusto Pinochet came to power after a coup on September 11, 1973
ousted President Salvador Allende, a Socialist who sought to redistribute property
and wealth through the expropriation of land and the nationalization of industry.
See, e.g., TANYA HARMER, ALLENDE’S CHILE AND THE INTER-AMERICAN COLD
WAR 21–22, 85–86, 90, 237–47 (2011). For an explanation of the enactment of the
Constitution by the Military Junta, see ROBERT BARROS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DICTATORSHIP: PINOCHET, THE JUNTA, AND THE 1980 CONSTITUTION 167
(2002).
15. C.P. art. 20 (Chile).
16. C.P. ch. 7 (Chile).
17. Domingo Lovera, Derechos sociales en la Constitución del 80 (y de 1989 y de 2005), in
EN NOMBRE DEL PUEBLO: DEBATE SOBRE EL CAMBIO CONSTITUCIONAL EN CHILE
217, 223–25 (Claudio Fuentes ed., 2010).
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marized as the ‘rights revolution that never was.’18 In a way, as I explain in
greater detail below, it could be said that the new Constitution furthered
some “legalistic” aspects of Chilean legal culture but lessened its “positivis-
tic” aspects insofar as “positivism” meant value relativism.19
Consistent with other aspects of Chile’s internal legal culture, the
1980 Constitution was preceded and shaped by a revived natural law dis-
course rooted in a conservative version of Catholic doctrines.20 Natural law
has served important ideological functions for the Chilean Right. Relying
on natural law ideology, a group of conservative lawyers was able not only
to radically transform the Chilean legal order during the Pinochet dictator-
ship (1973–1990), but also has been able to maintain its hegemony over
constitutional norms, even after losing power in 1990 at the hands of the
center-left Concertación government.21 Indeed, natural law-inspired lawyers
became an important part of the ideological and intellectual support of the
Junta; the other part was represented by the, perhaps more famous, “Chi-
cago Boys” economists.22
The lawyers allied with the Military Junta employed natural law argu-
ments to both support and steer the political and legal transformations
sought by the Junta. First and foremost, natural law discourse provided a
18. Javier A. Couso, The Judicialization of Chilean Politics: The Rights Revolution that
Never Was, in THE JUDICIALIZATION OF POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 3,
at 105.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 34–35.
20. See, e.g., JAVIER COUSO ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CHILE 174 (Roger
Blanpain ed., Wolters Kluwer L. & Bus. 2011) (“Regarding the notion of rights
behind the 1980 Charter, most Chilean scholars agree on its Christian-natural-law-
oriented doctrine.”).
21. During the period under study, there were two major coalitions in Chile: the
Center-Left Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (Concert of Parties for De-
mocracy), principally formed by the Christian Democrat Party, the Socialist Party,
the Party for Democracy, and the smaller Radical Party; and the Right’s coalition
Alianza por Chile (Alliance for Chile; the coalition has had various names over the
years), which included the National Renewal Party and the Democratic Independent
Union. John M. Carey, Parties, Coalitions, and the Chilean Congress in the 1990s, in
LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 222, 224–25 (Scott Morgenstern &
Benito Nacif eds., 2002).
22. See JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS, PINOCHET’S ECONOMISTS: THE CHICAGO SCHOOL IN
CHILE 16–21 (Crawfurd D. Goodwin ser. ed., 1995). In fact, these two groups
joined forces during the dictatorship due to their concurrent concerns and strategies,
succeeding in steering it towards a minimal-state program—an outcome that dif-
fered radically from what happened in most military dictatorships in Latin America.
This alliance between lawyers and economists, which took form between 1973 and
1977, was the basis for the foundation of the politically authoritarian, socially con-
servative, and economically neoliberal Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) party
in 1983, which will be so prominent in this story. See MARCELO POLLACK, THE
NEW RIGHT IN CHILE, 1973–97 65–66, 88–89 (1999).
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justification for the 1973 coup that ousted President Salvador Allende by
endorsing the right to legitimate rebellion.23 Later, the Catholic concept of
subsidiarity, referring to the restraint that the State has to keep vis-à-vis civil
society, offered a code name for privatization, deregulation, and the retreat
of the State in the provision of education, healthcare, and social security.24
And while lacking in positive liberties, the Constitution strengthened nega-
tive liberties such as economic freedom, property rights, and freedom of
teaching. These innovations were wrapped in rhetoric of inalienable natural
rights that existed prior to and were superior to the State. As the Constitu-
tion put it, “[t]he exercise of sovereignty recognizes as a limitation the re-
spect for the essential rights originating from human nature.”25
Furthermore, the 1980 Constitution included for the first time in Chilean
constitutional history an explicit mention of the right to life.26 This was
consistent with the official Catholic position proclaimed in Paul VI’s Of
Human Life,27but a paradoxical innovation coming from a murderous
dictatorship.
These natural law-inspired arguments were elaborated, deployed in
public discourse, and translated into legislation by a group of lawyers who
had graduated from the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. Many of
these lawyers worked in governmental departments during the dictatorship
and later became politicians, mainly in the Independent Democratic Union
(Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI) party.28 Jaime Guzmán was the
most prominent among them. Guzmán founded the conservative student
movement Gremialismo at the Pontifical Catholic University in 1967 and
later became a professor of constitutional law there.29 He was an outspoken
leader of the opposition to President Salvador Allende from the moment of
23. Junta Militar de Gobierno - Chile, Bando Nº 5, § 12 (11 septiembre 1973), availa-
ble at http://www.archivochile.com/Dictadura_militar/doc_jm_gob_pino8/
DMdocjm0023.pdf (“The arguments invoked here are, in light of the classical doc-
trine that characterizes our historical thinking, enough to justify our intervention to
depose the illegitimate and immoral government, unrepresentative of the national
soul, in order to avoid the greater evils that the current void of authority could
produce.”).
24. Mario Sznajder, Globalization and Limited Democracy through the Mirror of History in
Chile, in GLOBALITY AND MULTIPLE MODERNITIES: COMPARATIVE NORTH AMERI-
CAN AND LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 183, 192–93 (Luis Roniger & Carlos H.
Waisman eds., 2002).
25. C.P. art. 5 (Chile).
26. See infra Part I.
27. ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE PAUL VI “HUMANAE VITAE”: THE RIGHT ORDERING
OF THE PROCREATION OF CHILDREN (Rev. Alan C. Clark & Rev. Geoffrey
Crawfurd trans., 1968) (Holy See).
28. POLLACK, supra note 22, at 116.
29. POLLACK, supra note 22, 31–36, 116.
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his election in 1970. After a coup lead by General Augusto Pinochet over-
threw President Allende, Guzmán became a political and constitutional ad-
visor to the Military Junta. After founding the UDI with his longtime
followers in 1983, he became a Senator in the first democratic elections of
1989.30 In 1991, Guzmán was assassinated by a terrorist organization.
Guzmán did not simply create the Gremialismo as a political organiza-
tion to oppose the radicalization of campus politics in the late 60s; rather,
he endowed it with a doctrine based on an individualistic reinterpretation of
Catholic social thought that would have a broad social impact.31 That doc-
trine later infused the 1980 Constitution and still remains the political plat-
form of UDI.32 Guzmán believed that from the primacy of the individual
and the subsidiarity of the state derived, as a logical consequence, “the right
to private property and the free initiative in the economic field (generally
known as ‘free enterprise’) that correctly understood are not only economi-
cally efficient formulae, but also faithful expressions of human nature and
safeguards of freedom.”33
Once the 1980 Constitution was in place, constitutional law profes-
sors who subscribed to its natural law inspiration began arguing that it rep-
resented a departure from previous constitutional documents. They claimed
that while old positivistic constitutionalism was minimalist and deferential
towards legislation, the new natural law constitutionalism was robust and
value-ridden. Furthermore, whereas old constitutionalism regarded its open
clauses as political programs to be implemented by the political branches of
government, the new natural law constitutionalism regarded its principles as
having a legally binding status, to be interpreted and implemented by
courts. For example, José L. Cea, a professor at the Pontifical Catholic Uni-
versity of Chile and a member of the Constitutional Tribunal at the time it
handed down two decisions about the pill, has argued that the system of
30. POLLACK, supra note 22, 89, 187.
31. Cristi has characterized Guzmán’s doctrine, based on what he deems a misled read-
ing of John XXIII’s encyclicals, as offering a “radicalized version of the thomistic
theory of relational entities” that allows Guzmán to “reorient the principle of sub-
sidiarity towards the minimalization of state action and to sustain an individualistic
interpretation of property rights.” RENATO CRISTI, EL PENSAMIENTO POLÍTICO DE
JAIME GUZMÁN: UNA BIOGRAFÍA INTELECTUAL 26 (2011).
32. Doctrina y Principios, UNIÓN DEMÓCRATA INDEPENDIENTE, http://www.udi.cl/web-
site/contenido.php?S=7&SC=6&C=6 (1991) (Chile) (last visited Feb. 4, 2014)
(“The Independent Democratic Union believes in the principle of subsidiarity as the
basis of a free society. The respect of personal freedom and the autonomy of inter-
mediate social bodies demand that neither the State nor any other social group en-
croaches or absorbs the specific domain of the smaller entities or the freedom of
individuals.”).
33. Arturo Fontaine Talavera, El miedo y otros escritos. El pensamiento de Jaime Guzmán
E., 42 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS 251, 256–57 (1991) (emphasis added) (Chile).
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values that shapes the Constitution enacted in 1980 “is a corrective to the
excesses of formalist positivism and of all-embracing state voluntarism.”34
To his mind, these pejorative qualities were expressed paradigmatically in
the legal instrumentalism of the Allende administration, which tried “to
manipulate or instrumentalize bourgeois laws, ignoring the values that in-
fuse it with legitimacy in order to keep only its neutral, formalistic
wrapper.”35
Several leitmotifs and labels have been used by academics working
within this school to describe the distinctiveness of this new constitutional-
ism: the “comprehensive Constitution”36—the Constitution contains an-
swers to all problems; the “axiological interpretation of the
Constitution”37—the Constitution is loaded with determined values that
have to guide the judge; the “normative force” of the Constitution38—the
Constitution has the binding force and the determinacy of any statute;39
and, most famously the “constitutionalization” of the legal system40—all the
rest of the legal system must be interpreted in light of constitutional princi-
ples and values.41 To the outside observer, these points might seem to evoke
Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivism, but they are in fact much closer to Justice
Antonin Scalia’s view that the Constitution of the United States is “an en-
actment that has a fixed meaning ascertainable through the usual devices
familiar to those learned in the law.”42 This embrace of originalism, to be
sure, is a smart move for the proponents of natural law constitutionalism
who shore up their own views against any change by asserting that the 1980
34. José Luis Cea Egaña, La interpretación axiológica de la Constitución, in UNIVERSIDAD
DE CHILE & UNIVERSIDAD ADOLFO IBÁÑEZ, INTERPRETACIÓN, INTEGRACIÓN Y
RAZONAMIENTO JURÍDICOS 89, 95 (1992) (Chile) [hereinafter Cea Egaña, La inter-
pretación axiológica de la Constitución].
35. JOSÉ LUIS CEA EGAÑA, I DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL CHILENO 44 (2002).
36. José Luis Cea Egaña, La Constitución plena, 11 VIGILIA 46, 48 (1979) (Chile).
37. Cea Egaña, La interpretación axiológica de la Constitución, supra note 34.
38. Luz Bulnes Aldunate, La Fuerza Normativa de la Constitución, 25 REVISTA CHILENA
DE DERECHO 137, 137 (1998); Miguel Angel Fernández González, La Fuerza
Normativa de la Constitución, 63 REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO 77, 77 (2001)
(Chile).
39. These authors ignore the longstanding indeterminacy debate among legal theorists.
40. José Luis Cea Engaña, La constitucionalización del Derecho, 59 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PÚBLICO 11 (1996) (Chile).
41. Pablo Ruiz-Tagle, an outspoken critic of this approach, prefers to use the more de-
scriptive label of “pontifical doctrine,” as “besides responding to the influence of
papal encyclicals, it is based at the institution of higher education that bears this
name,” i.e., the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. RENATO CRISTI & PABLO
RUIZ-TAGLE, LA REPÚBLICA EN CHILE: TEORÍA Y PRÁCTICA DEL CONSTITUCIONAL-
ISMO REPUBLICANO 133 (2006).
42. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989).
2014] M O R N I N G - A F T E R  D E C I S I O N S 133
Constitution, which was written by some of them, has a stable and fixed
meaning that lies beyond the realm of political contestation.
Natural law constitutionalism is of great importance to anti-emer-
gency contraception litigation. Its natural law inspiration is evident and
often self-proclaimed; for example, Ángela Vivanco, a professor at the Cath-
olic University and currently Dean of the Saint Thomas Aquinas Law
school, declared that “the Constitution of 1980 subscribes to a natural law
understanding of the law, since the construction of this chapter [on the
bases of the institutional order], and the history of its establishment, indi-
cate that the Constitution includes elements contained in human nature
and preexisting to the State.”43 The intersection between Catholicism, anti-
abortion scholarship, and anti-pill legal mobilization is particularly clear.
For example, Figueroa, when reviewing the works of Catholic constitutional
law professors who have written about the right to life, observes that most
of them “tend to mention God, Christian ethics, or forthrightly Catholic
morals” when they explore the constitutional concept of personhood and
the foundations of the right to life.44 Still, the professors’ professional iden-
tity and their capacity to translate their religious positions into juridical
arguments turn them into the kind of Catholic advocates who Lemaitre
describes as arguing from “reason alone.” In other words, “the lay faithful,
often occupying public offices or other positions of influence” appeal “to
constitutional and human rights law in courts and legislatures” in order to
defend the agenda of the Catholic Church,45 a strategy that replaces the
clergy’s invocation of scripture, religious authority, or revelation.
I. A PROSOPOGRAPHY OF NATURAL LAW LITIGANTS46
In order to fully understand the religious, professional, and political
networks behind the anti-pill legal mobilization, this Part will explore the
profiles of the litigants who led this attack on emergency contraception.
43. ÁNGELA VIVANCO, 2 CURSO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL. ASPECTOS DOGMÁT-
ICOS DE LA CARTA FUNDAMENTAL DE 1980 33 (2006).
44. Rodolfo Figueroa Garcı́a-Huidobro, Concepto de persona, titularidad del derecho a la
vida y aborto, 20 REVISTA DE DERECHO (VALDIVIA) 95, 100 n.27 (2007) (Chile).
His list of law professors who have written on the right to life from a Catholic
natural law perspective includes Catholic University professors José L. Cea, Enrique
Evans, Arturo Fermandois, Jorge Precht, José P. Silva, Eduardo Soto, José J. Ugarte,
Ángela Vivanco, Patricio Zapata, University of Los Andes professor Hernán Corral,
and University Gabriela Mistral professor Jorge Varela.
45. Symposium, Julieta Lemaitre, By reason alone: Catholicism, constitutions, and sex in
the Americas, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 493, 494 (2012).
46. Prosopography is, according to the Oxford Dictionary, “a description of a person’s
appearance, personality, career, etc., or a collection of such descriptions.”
Originating in the work of classical historians, social scientists use these descriptions
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Between 2001 and 2010 important Chilean political and social actors,
including members of both major political coalitions and influential relig-
ious leaders, challenged the lawfulness of emergency contraception, arguing
that its effects were abortifacient and thus contrary to the absolute prohibi-
tion of abortion by Chilean legislation. As a result, a sustained anti-pill legal
mobilization threatened, with varying degrees of success, the attempt to pro-
vide this medicine widely and freely. Courts were the main fora for this
opposition. Support of the policy came mainly from the Executive: first, by
issuing decrees authorizing distribution of the pill by the public health sys-
tem, and then launching the legislative process that ultimately begat a stat-
ute guaranteeing the supply of the pill.47 As we will see, President Ricardo
Lagos (2000–2006) stood against the legal challenges to the administrative
authorization of the pill by the Institute of Public Health. Likewise, Presi-
dent Michelle Bachelet not only served as Minister of Health during the
first half of the Lagos administration and as President (2006–2010) when
the anti-pill opposition moved to confront the Ministry of Health before
the Constitutional Tribunal, but also sent a bill to Congress to secure the
legality of the pill even after the Tribunal had declared it unconstitutional.
to provide context to their studies in the form of personal life stories that they
consider representative of larger social trends. See Lawrence Stone, Prosopography,
100 DæDALUS 46 (1971).
47. This calls for a brief explanation of the way that the Chilean constitutional system
handles the creation of norms. There are two normative instruments: decrees issued
by the President using his potestad reglamentaria (regulatory powers) and legislation.
The interaction between these two forms is a complex matter. The President has two
forms of regulatory powers: executive regulatory powers, which implement or en-
force legislation; and autonomous regulatory powers, which regulate things that are
not reserved for statutory regulation. Simultaneously, there are certain matters whose
regulation falls within the scope of legislation, and thus that exclude the deployment
of autonomous regulatory powers: this is the principle of reserva legal (statutory res-
ervation). The 1980 Constitution, mindful of the possibility that Pinochet or his
heir might one day rule with an elected Congress, sought to increase the area of the
President’s autonomous regulatory powers; but since the beginning of the demo-
cratic governments in 1990, all the relevant institutions—the Executive, Congress,
and the Constitutional Tribunal—have decreased the scope of autonomous regula-
tory powers, increasing the space of statutory reservation. This does not mean, how-
ever, that the power of the Executive has suffered a net loss. The President can always
use his executive regulatory powers, and he has an ample power to present bills to
Congress; in fact, there are vast areas of legislation that can only begin with a Presi-
dential law proposal, in what is known as the President’s iniciativa exclusiva (exclu-
sionary initiative). What these adaptations of constitutional practice under civilian
rule meant was that the President would bring most issues to discussion in Congress,
creating the consensual politics that were so characteristic of the Chilean transition
to democracy. See Peter M. Siavelis, Exaggerated Presidentialism and Moderate Presi-
dents: Executive-Legislative Relations in Chile, in LEGISLATIVE POLITICS IN LATIN
AMERICA 79 (Scott Morgenstern & Benito Nacif eds. 2002).
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In so doing, she managed to solve the issue in a way favorable to reproduc-
tive rights.
A decade of legal battles would not have been possible without the
small group of organizers and leaders who gave direction and strategy to the
anti-pill mobilization, both inside and outside the courts. Their profiles evi-
dence the extensive political and religious connections of the anti-pill legal
mobilization, constituting an important part of the context of the cases. In a
brief exercise of prosopography, I will look at three individuals who stood
out for their contribution in grassroots organization, litigation, and congres-
sional leadership, respectively: Juan Enrique Jara, Jorge Reyes, and José
Antonio Kast.
Juan Enrique Jara
In 2001, while still a law student at the University of Los Andes,48
Juan Enrique Jara brought one of the first lawsuits against the morning-after
pill.49 In 2006, Revista El Sábado, a weekly magazine published by the con-
servative newspaper El Mercurio,50 ranked Jara as one of the 100 “notable
young leaders” of that year introducing him with these words:
He brings together young people of conservative leanings to
demonstrate against divorce, the morning-after pill, and eutha-
nasia. He sued four laboratories that produce the pill, and got a
pill produced by two laboratories taken off the market. Now, he
is trying to promote legislation about cloning. Five years ago,
when he was still a law student at the University of Los Andes,
48. The University of Los Andes is a nonprofit private institution of higher education
established in 1989 by members of the Opus Dei, a Catholic movement founded in
1928 by the Spaniard José Marı́a Escriba. The University of Los Andes has more
private donations than any other Chilean university, a fact that reveals the ascen-
dancy of the Opus Dei among the Chilean entrepreneurial class. The intellectual,
moral, and religious leadership of the Opus Dei, and consequently of the University
of Los Andes, stands consistently on the conservative side on any public discussion
in Chile. For an account of the cultural, financial, and political power of the Opus
Dei in Chile, see MARÍA O. MÖNCKEBERG, EL IMPERIO DEL OPUS DEI EN CHILE
(2003).
49. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [court of appeals], 28 mayo 2001, “Philippi Iz-
quierdo c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 850–2001 (Chile).
50. El Mercurio is by any account the most influential newspaper of Chile. For an ac-
count of its influential role in Chilean history, which includes the collaboration of its
owner, Agustı́n Edwards, with the C.I.A. during the presidency of the socialist Salva-
dor Allende and the newspaper’s silence about human rights violations during the
dictatorship, see PAULETTE DOUGNAC ET AL., EL DIARIO DE AUGUSTÍN: CINCO
ESTUDIOS DE CASOS SOBRE El Mercurio y los derechos humanos (1973–1990) (Clau-
dia Lagos, 2009) (Chile).
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Jara formed the Front for Choice (for Life and Family), a group
that has gone out to the streets to protest and that, in 2003,
gathered 2,500 people in front of the Presidential Palace, La
Moneda, to protest divorce legislation.”51
Jara ran unsuccessfully for Congress twice: in 2001, as a candidate of
the UDI, he obtained 3.42% of the vote in the 26th District; and in 2009,
as a candidate of the shortly-lived Christian Humanist Movement, he ob-
tained 4.83% in the 9th District.52 During his last campaign, in an inter-
view with the progressive biweekly magazine, The Clinic, Jara declared, “I
will do my best to approve pro-life legislation,” because “abortion is a
nightmare for women” who “cannot forget that they have murdered a child,
something so brutal that whenever they see a drain they begin to vomit.”53
Jorge Reyes
Attorney Jorge Reyes, another important protagonist of the anti-pill
legal movement, said that he was inspired to study law at the age of fifteen
when he conducted an interview with Jaime Guzmán.54 After becoming a
lawyer, he worked for fourteen years as a legal advisor to UDI congressman
Carlos Bombal.55
Reyes was also actively involved in another high-profile case con-
fronting traditional morality with a civil liberties claim: the litigation sur-
rounding the ban on the film The Last Temptation of Christ. On January 20,
1997, Reyes and other lawyers brought a request for a constitutional rights
injunction in the Court of Appeals of Santiago against the November 11,
1996 decision by the Chilean Film Rating Board that had allowed the exhi-
bition of the film, which had been prohibited in the country since its release
51. Abogado Juan Enrique Jara, RED DE LÍDERES (3 julio 2013, 10:19 PM), http://www
.redlideres.cl/1813/article-73054.html (Chile).
52. SERVICIO ELECTORAL DEL REPÚBLICA DE CHILE, Votación por Lista/Pacto Pais:
Diputados 2001, ELECCIÓN DE DIPUTADOS 2001, http://historico.servel.cl/SitioHis-
torico/index2001_dipu.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2014); SERVICIO ELECTORAL DEL
REPÚBLICA DE CHILE, Votación por Lista/Pacto Pais: Diputados 2009, ELECCIÓN DE
DIPUTADOS 2009, http://historico.servel.cl/SitioHistorico/index2009_dipu.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2014).
53. Juan Enrique Jara, del Movimiento Humanista Cristiano: “Me la jugaré por una legisla-
ción pro vida,” THE CLINIC ONLINE (30 agosto 2009), http://www.theclinic.cl/
2009/08/30/juan-enrique-jara-del-movimiento-humanista-cristiano-”me-la-jugare-
por-una-legislacion-pro-vida” (Chile).
54. Claudia Urzúa & Sebastián Vasquez, La historia del abogado que tras ocho años logró
sacar la “pı́ldora” del sistema público, LA TERCERA, 27 abril 2008, available at http://
www.jesus.cl/iglesia/paso_iglesia/recortes/recorte.php?id=8714 (Chile).
55. Id.
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during the last days of the Pinochet dictatorship.56 To satisfy the require-
ments of standing posed by the Chilean Constitution, which demands that
constitutional rights injunctions be presented by individuals “on their own,
or through a third party,”57 Reyes and his associates presented this lawsuit
“on behalf of Jesus Christ, the Catholic Church, and themselves.”58 They
won this case both at the Court of Appeals of Santiago and the Supreme
Court, but a group of liberal lawyers challenged this outcome in Olmedo
Bustos et. al v. Chile, heard by the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.59 On April 30, 1999, Reyes petitioned the Inter-American Court to
be heard as amicus curiae, but the Court rejected his petition for procedural
reasons.60
In 2001, Reyes became involved in the first lawsuit against emergency
contraception in Chile on behalf of the NGO Worldwide Organization of
Mothers (Organización Mundial de Madres).61 Since then, he has become a
highly visible figure, acting as a spokesperson for conservative causes not
only through lawsuits but also on talk shows.62 Reyes, according to report-
ers, “speaks of ‘we’ when he refers to the self-described ‘pro-life’ movement,
of which he is the visible face since the end of the last decade.”63 He
staunchly defends the role that litigation has played for the pro-life move-
ment. For example, Reyes remarks that being called an “extremist” annoys
him, as “we have used peaceful means, we have used the courts and have
always shown our faces.”64 As he puts it, “there is nothing more peaceful
and respectful of the other [than courts], where one makes claims, is heard,
provides evidence and submits oneself to the decision of a superior.”65
56. Olmedo-Bustos v. Chile (“The Last Temptation of Christ” Case), Merits, Repara-
tions, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 60 (Feb. 5,
2001).
57. C.P. art. 20 (Chile).
58. Olmedo-Bustos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 60.
59. Olmedo-Bustos, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 60.
60. Ultimately, the Court condemned the state of Chile for censorship. Olmedo-Bustos,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶   103 (finding that “the State must amend its
domestic law, within a reasonable period, in order to eliminate prior censorship to
allow exhibition of the film ‘The Last Temptation of Christ.’ ”).
61. Carolina Valenzuela, Corte Suprema emite fallo que revoca la comercialización de la
“pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (30 agosto 2001, 12:23 PM), http:/
/www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/08/30/64575/corte-suprema-emite-fallo-
que-revoca-la-comercializacion-de-la-pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile).
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José Antonio Kast
Between 2001 and 2005, the Chilean anti-pill movement channeled
its force through constitutional and administrative-law remedies, the resolu-
tion of which fell to courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and the Su-
preme Court. But after exhausting the possibilities offered by ordinary
courts, in 2006 the litigants brought the conflict under the jurisdiction of
the Constitutional Tribunal.66 With that, the right to initiate actions passed
to Congress, whose members possess sole constitutional authority to request
the Constitutional Tribunal use its powers of abstract constitutional re-
view.67 Specifically, the power to continue the litigation passed to José
Antonio Kast, a UDI member of the Chamber of Deputies. Kast personally
gathered the necessary signatures of his fellow congressmen to request the
intervention of the Constitutional Tribunal,68 and devised the legal strategy
of the case together with Reyes.69 Kast is a devout Catholic, who believes
that Catholics “have the obligation to take part [in politics], as witnesses of
the Truth.”70 On March 11, 2010, which marked the inauguration of the
first administration of the Right after two decades of Center-Left pre-
sidencies, Kast declared that the new government had “a great mission,
which involves not only the reconstruction of much of our country [after
the 2010 earthquake], but also the cultural and ethical reconstruction of our
people.”71
66. The Constitutional Tribunal is separate from ordinary courts, which are composed
of courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court. The Constitu-
tional Tribunal only deals with the interpretation of the Constitution; if a constitu-
tional issue is raised in an ordinary court, either the litigants or the court can present
a referral to the Tribunal. The only constitutional matter reserved to ordinary courts
is the cognizance of constitutional rights injunctions by courts of appeals, which can
be appealed to the Supreme Court. See COUSO ET AL., supra note 20, at 118.
67. The distinction between a priori or abstract review and a posteriori or concrete review
hinges on “whether the constitutionality of a law or administrative action is deter-
mined before or after it takes effect,” and, therefore, “whether a declaration of un-
constitutionality can be made in the absence of an actual case or controversy.” Ran
Hirschl, The Judicialization of Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
POLITICS 119, 130 (Keith E. Whittington, R. Daniel Kelemen & Gregory A.
Caldeira eds., 2008).
68. TC acoge requerimiento de la Alianza contra pı́ldora del dı́a después, EL MERCURIO




70. Seminario Iglesia y Polı́tica en Chile, CATHOLIC.NET, http://www.es.catholic.net/em-
presarioscatolicos/464/997/articulo.php?id=44741 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
71. José Antonio Kast, Los costos del estilo de “gobierno ciudadano”, LA TERCERA BLOG
(13 marzo 2010), http://blog.latercera.com/blog/jakast/entry/los_costos_del_estilo_
de (Chile).
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Kast has forged a strong alliance with the bishop of his district, Juan
Ignacio González Errázuriz, a member of the Opus Dei. Before the last
mayoral election, González “wrote a four page document telling his congre-
gation how to vote”72—an important intervention in a district where 63.3%
of the population are practicing Catholics—declaring that “no one should
support any candidate who supports the distribution of the morning-after
pill”73 or “encourages or defends homosexual or lesbian marriages, physical
or chemical contraception or who would like to equate marriage with do-
mestic partnerships.”74 His involvement in the “pro-life” mobilization cat-
apulted Kast to a position of leadership among the most conservative
section of the UDI. When he decided to run for its chairmanship in 2008,
he forced the first competitive election within the party since Guzmán
founded it in 1983.75
The religious aspect of the anti-pill movement emerges in various
other anecdotes. In the oral arguments held for a constitutional rights in-
junction filed in 2001 by natural law litigants, a group of fourteen-year-old
students from religious high schools packed the courtroom and prayed a
Hail Mary “as a way to give strength to the attorneys opposing the pill, who
were the first ones to intervene in the hearing.”76 But, as we will see, they
were not the only ones capable of mobilizing people around judicial
processes in this series of events: pro-pill protests also flooded the streets as
anti-pill victories progressed.
II. THE BEGINNING: ANTI-CONTRACEPTION LITIGATION
BEFORE ORDINARY COURTS
This decade-long struggle began in the early days of the twenty-first
century when the Chilean Institute of Public Health (Instituto de Salud Púb-
lica, ISP) announced that it would consider approving a levonorgestrel-
based emergency contraception pill.77 The announcement stirred immediate
72. Torres Verónica, El mundo que José Antonio Kast no quiere ver: San Bernardo, la tierra




75. At that time, and in a display of bad taste, his supporters started calling him “the
white Obama,” leading some to ridicule him by christening him “Ku Klux Kast.”
See, e.g., makerscorp, NTN, AMOR AL PODER 4, YOUTUBE (Oct. 21, 2009), http:/
/www.youtube.com/watch?v=qMeM6bQ6xwc.
76. CLAUDIA DIDES CASTILLO, VOCES EN EMERGENCIA: EL DISCURSO CONSERVADOR Y
LA PÍLDORA DEL DÍA DESPUÉS 75 (2006) (Chile).
77. Buscan evitar uso de “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (13 febrero
2001, 12:16 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/02/13/46045/bus
can-evitar-uso-de-pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile)
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opposition by the Catholic Church and quick partisan alignment on the
issue.78 In March 2001, the ISP released a report holding that the so-called
“morning-after” pill did not cause abortions, attempting to clear the way for
its approval.79 The Church and conservative groups, however, had a differ-
ent opinion. The Chilean Episcopal Conference criticized the decision, ar-
guing that “it acts against a being that certainly has received the invaluable
gift of life.”80 A group of conservative lawyers responded by filing a consti-
tutional rights injunction against the ISP in order to stop its distribution.81
The congressional candidates of the UDI signed a document expressing
their decision to oppose the pill82 and called their peers from the center-left
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) to join
them in the fight.83 On the other side, President Lagos and Minister of
Health Michelle Bachelet both expressed their commitment to support the
pill.84 In the center-left, the Party for Democracy (Partido Por la
Democracia, PPD) expressed its support for the decision, arguing that the
78. Iglesia Católica rechazó venta de la “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE
(20 marzo 2001, 12:49 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/detalle/detal-
lenoticias.asp?idnoticia=49539 (Chile). For a compilation of the Catholic Church’s
pronouncements and interventions on the issue, see Documentos de la Conferencia
Episcopal de Chile, IGLESIA.CL, http://www.iglesia.cl/especiales/porlavida/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2014).
79. Informe del ISP estima que pı́ldora del dı́a después no es abortiva, EL MERCURIO ON-
LINE (16 marzo 2001, 3:51 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/03/
16/49252/informe-del-isp-estima-que-pildora-del-dia-despues-no-es-abortiva.html
(Chile).
80. Iglesia Católica rechazó venta de la “pı́ldora del dı́a después,” supra note 78.
81. Buscan evitar uso de “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, supra note 77.
82. Candidatos a disputados UDI firman compromiso contra el aborto, EL MERCURIO ON-
LINE (16 marzo 2001, 1:46 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/03/
16/49235/candidatos-a-disputados-udi-firman-compromiso-contra-el-aborto.html
(Chile).
83. UDI llama a DC a protestar juntos contra “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL MERCURIO
ONLINE (5 marzo 2001, 11:44 AM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/
03/05/47906/udi-llama-a-dc-a-protestar-juntos-contra-pildora-del-dia-despues.html
(Chile).
84. Lagos Llamó a no Temer Debate Sobre “Pı́ldora del Dı́a Después”, EL MERCURIO ON-
LINE (7 marzo 2001, 11:00 AM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/03/
07/48146/lagos-llamo-a-no-temer-debate-sobre-pildora-del-dia-despues.html
(Chile); Ministra Bachelet se Refirió a la Polémica “Pı́ldora del Dı́a Después”, EL MER-
CURIO ONLINE (1 marzo 2001, 8:08 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2001/03/01/47641/ministra-bachelet-se-refirio-a-la-polemica-pildora-del-dia-
despues.html (Chile).
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drug “is not an abortive pill and constitutes an advancement of medical
science.”85
On February 13, 2001, six organizations filed a request for a constitu-
tional rights injunction before the Court of Appeals of Santiago against the
ISP and the Minister of Health “in their own name and on behalf of those
about to be born in Chile, of their mothers and parents, and especially of
any woman, potentially a victim” to defend “their right to life, which they
consider threatened by the arbitrary and illegal act of the health authorities,
which accepted a request for marketing authorization and issued a permit
for the commercialization of the drug Postinal.”86 Oral arguments were
heard on May 14, and on May 28, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
injunction request for lack of standing, declaring that the unborn, as a
group seeking relief, were “indefinite and lacked the indispensable discrete-
ness that the law requires to request the constitutional rights injunction in
question.”87 The Court added:
The doctrinal discussion put forward in this request and its sup-
porting briefs, together with the scientific and technical studies
that grounded the decision of the ISP, which the complainants
challenge, lie beyond the scope of constitutional rights injunc-
tions, as it would demand full use of the rules of evidence, which
would include diverse and complex means of proof, proceedings
that are not compatible with the objective [of the constitutional
rights injunction] of affording a quick and efficient remedy to
protect an eventual affected party.88
A dissent was filed by Judge Marı́a Antonia Morales, who invoked what
would become the theme of anti-pill adjudication in the decade to come:
the idea that the Constitution “recognizes as the first and most fundamental
of all the rights that it guarantees, the right to life, and imposes on the law
the duty to protect the life of those about to be born in all phases of its
development from the moment of conception.”89 The Court of Appeals’
dismissal of the injunction request through formalistic standing require-
85. PPD respalda uso de la pı́ldora del “dı́a después”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (3 marzo
2001, 6:23 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/03/03/47815/ppd-
respalda-uso-de-la-pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile).
86. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.][court of appeals], 28 mayo 2001, “Philippi Iz-
quierdo c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 850–2001, slip op. at § 1
(Chile).
87. C. Apel., 28 mayo 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 9.
88. C. Apel., 28 mayo 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 11.
89. C. Apel., 28 mayo 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 11 (Morales, J.,
dissenting).
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ments harkens back to the restrictive constitutional review characteristic of
Chilean courts prior to the 1980 Constitution’s entry into force.90
The plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Supreme Court on June 1, 2001,
which was decided on August 30, 2001.91 The Supreme Court reversed,
declaring that standing to request a constitutional rights injunction “only
requires the existence of concrete beings that may be affected by the action
that is being denounced as arbitrary or illegal, even if it is unknown where
they are or if there is uncertainty about their name or any other individual-
izing characteristics.”92 With respect to the substance of the injunction, the
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that since the in-
junction request claimed that “the drug . . . could, in one of its results,
affect the fertilized egg, that is an embryo with all of its genetic load,
preventing it from gaining implantation in the uterus and thus causing an
abortion.”93 The Court stated, “what needs to be resolved is at what point
can or ought we recognize legitimately and legally the existence of a human
being.”94 The decision concluded that “those about to be born, whatever
their stage of prenatal development—since the constitutional norm does
not make distinctions—have a right to life.”95 This line of reasoning and
conceptual framework would characterize later decisions by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal that declared presidential decrees supporting emergency
contraception unconstitutional. The Supreme Court, as we have seen,
shared the perspective of the natural law litigants, presenting the issue exclu-
sively as a right-to-life problem. These terms naturally invoke an anti-pill
solution and neglect the interests of pregnant women and of public health
authorities. The major achievement of the anti-pill movement was its suc-
cess in framing the issue in this way.96
90. Through this Constitution, as I have observed, the Junta enhanced constitutional
adjudication in order to protect private property and economic freedoms. Before its
enactment, both the Supreme Court and the short-lived Constitutional Tribunal
used their powers with considerable self-restraint. See HILBINK, supra note 8;
FAÚNDEZ, supra note 12, at 201.
91. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 30 agosto 2001, “Philippi Iz-
quierdo c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 2186–2001 (Chile).
92. C.S.J., 30 agosto 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 8.
93. C.S.J., 30 agosto 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 13.
94. C.S.J., 30 agosto 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 14.
95. C.S.J., 30 agosto 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 17.
96. Two Justices filed a dissent arguing, as the majority had asserted in the first instance
ruling, that the nature of the constitutional rights injunction renders it unfit “to
introduce oneself in the study and resolution of questions that entail scientific
knowledge, matters that belong to a full trial with ample opportunities to argue,
respond, debate, substantiate, and provide evidence, for all the parties.” C.S.J., 30
agosto 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 2 (Kokisch & Yurac, JJ., dissenting).
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After the Supreme Court ruling, the ISP made a singular move: it
authorized a different company to distribute a different morning-after pill,
Postinor 2, also based on levonorgestrel.97 This reaction inaugurated a pat-
tern that would characterize the behavior of the Administration in this mat-
ter. I describe the ISP’s response as one of “legal resistance,” that is, of
persisting in a certain policy commitment in the face of judicial opposition
by means of devising new legal strategies to pursue them. The plaintiffs of
the original case, however, considered the ISP decision an act of disobedi-
ence to the Supreme Court ruling, and petitioned the Court to enforce its
previous decision against this new drug.98 The Supreme Court instructed
the Court of Appeals to respond to the petition, which it did on October
10, 2001.99 In its ruling, the Court of Appeals wrote that the Supreme
Court “annulled a distinct and single administrative act, e.g., Resolution Nº
2141 of March 21, 2001, of the ISP, but it did not prohibit, in general and
absolute terms, the circulation and commercialization of pharmaceutics
containing the drug Levonorgestrel, 0.75 mg.”100 The legal consequence of
interpreting the Supreme Court decision this way was clear because the
Civil Code establishes that in the Chilean legal system each judicial decision
is binding only for the case in which it had actually been pronounced.101
Thus, the Court of Appeals was able to conclude that the previous decision
“sanctions a concrete act, and therefore this Court is unable to give it an
extensive effect.”102 Once again, the Court of Appeals expressed a restrained
and formalistic understanding of constitutional adjudication that contrasts
with a more expansive constitutionalism rooted in natural law values.
The plaintiffs then moved to a new venue. They filed a petition before
a court of first instance to invalidate the administrative acts of the ISP on
the basis of their public law nullity.103 On June 30, 2004, Judge Silvia Papa
declared null the ISP’s authorization based on constitutional and other legal
arguments.104 For an administrative act to be valid, she argued, the act needs
97. “Postinor 2” es la nueva pı́ldora del dı́a después, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (29 agosto
2001, 9:44 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/08/29/64531/posti
nor-2-es-la-nueva-pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile).
98. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.][court of appeals], 10 octubre 2001, “Philippi Iz-
quierdo c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 850–2001, slip op. at § 1
(Chile).
99. C. Apel., 10 octubre 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 6.
100. C. Apel., 10 octubre 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 2.
101. CÓD. CIV. art. 3 (Chile).
102. C. Apel., 10 octubre 2001, “Philippi Izquierdo,” slip op. at § 7.
103. The Constitution establishes that actions by public bodies that do not satisfy consti-
tutional requirements are void, allowing individuals affected by those actions to file a
petition to declare that nullity. C.P. art. 7 (Chile).
104. Juzgados Civiles (J. Civ.) (civil courts), 30 junio 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES c.
Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 5839–2002 (Chile).
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to have a determinate end or goal consistent with Article 1 of the Constitu-
tion, which proclaims that “[t]he State is at the service of the human person,
and its goal is to promote the common good.”105 Based on Articles 75 and
76 of the Civil Code, the Judge concluded that “the protection that the
Judge must give [to the unborn] begins at the moment of conception, and
the second of these Articles does not establish a calculation or amount of
time that needs to be deducted, nor does it mention the moment of implan-
tation of the fertilized egg.”106 The legislature, she argued, “protects the
embryo of an individual of the human species before his birth, establishing
a special juridical status, prohibiting the performance of therapeutic abor-
tions in the Health Code and punishing abortion in our Criminal Code.”107
In consequence, she wrote, “there has been a misuse of power when the
institution has pursued a goal other than the one chosen by the legislator,
that is to protect the life of the unborn without making arbitrary distinc-
tions about whether the embryo is implanted or not.”108 In an interview
with the newspaper La Segunda, Judge Papa emphasized that Article 75 of
the Civil Code, which instructs judges to take all the measures that they
deem necessary to protect the life of the unborn, guided her decision. Fur-
thermore, she added that she relied on “[the ample] evidence provided by
researchers and physicians of different persuasions,” together with “legal
opinions and medical expert testimonies.”109
The decision of first instance was appealed, and the Court of Appeals
of Santiago, once more, asserted the legality of emergency contraception on
procedural grounds.110 The lower court had dismissed the ISP’s demurrer
105. C.P. art. 1 (Chile).
106. J. Civ., 30 junio 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 42.
107. J. Civ., 30 junio 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 44.
108. J. Civ., 30 junio 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 51.
109. Verónica Cerda F., Jueza Papa, la que falló en contra de la pı́ldora: “No soy pechoña”,
LA SEGUNDA (1 julio 2004), available at http://www.jesus.cl/iglesia/paso_iglesia/
recortes/recorte.php?id=2983 (Chile).
110. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.][courts of appeals], 10 diciembre 2004, “Centro
Juvenil AGES c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 4200–2003 (Chile).
The truly remarkable thing about the jurisprudential consistency of the Court of
Appeals of Santiago in this matter is that each decision was issued by a different
panel of judges. The May 28, 2001 decision dismissing the constitutional rights
injunction was taken by judges Rubén Ballesteros, Amanda Valdovinos, and the dis-
senting Marı́a Antonia Morales. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [courts of appeals],
28 mayo 2001, “Phillippi Izquierdo c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa:
850–2001 (Chile). The October 10, 2001 decision declining to extend the Supreme
Court ruling to the new morning-after pill approved by the Institute of Public
Health was taken by judge Marı́a Antonia Morales, joined by judges pro tempore
Marı́a Cristina Navajas and Ángel Cruchaga. Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [courts
of appeals], 10 octubre 2001, “Phillippi Izquierdo c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol
de la causa: 850–2001 (Chile). This decision is particularly striking as Marı́a Anto-
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asserting that the plaintiffs lacked standing to represent indeterminate
women and the unborn, a decision that the Court of Appeals overturned by
declaring that “in a State of Law like ours, where the principle of legality
rules first and foremost, the initiation of the process of adjudication—par-
ticularly in civil matters—is highly regulated.”111 For the Court of Appeals,
this meant that “to file an action in these kinds of issues it is necessary to
prove a present, legitimate, and reasonable interest on the part of those who
initiate the action in question, interest that must be understood as an injury
to the person or the group that sues or on whose name one is suing.”112
Thus, “neither the importance, object, or scope of the complaint, nor even
the justice of the demand, can alter or replace the aforementioned require-
ment.”113 The Court ruled that it was “forced to conclude that, in effect,
the plaintiffs lacked the necessary standing to sue.”114 Moreover, the Court
declared that it “cannot resolve the dispute presented in this case” because
judges can act “only on the basis of certainties, and are barred from recog-
nizing rights or duties deriving from scientific hypotheses currently under
discussion.”115
The Supreme Court put an end to this phase of the anti-pill litigation
by ruling on November 28, 2005, on a cassation application filed by the
plaintiffs against the Court of Appeals decision.116 The Supreme Court
nia Morales, who joined the Supreme Court as its first female member ever, only a
couple of weeks earlier, had previously voted against the pill. Histórico juramento de
mujeres en Corte Suprema, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (5 noviembre 2001, 9:20 AM),
http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2001/11/05/70397/historico-juramento-de-
mujeres-en-corte-suprema.html (Chile). Marı́a Cristina Navajas was the Dean of the
Catholic University Law School. Decanos, FACULTAD DE DERECHO, PONTIFICA
UNIVERSIDAD CATOLICA DE CHILE, http://derecho.uc.cl/Historia/decanos.html (last
visited March 13, 2014). In my opinion, her membership in this academic commu-
nity made unlikely her vote in favor of a restrained application to the anti-pill Su-
preme Court ruling. The December 10, 2004 decision overturning the public law
nullity of the ISP authorization was authored by judges Hugo Dolmetsch Urra and
Dobra Lusic Nadal, together with judge pro tempore Paulina Veloso Valenzuela.
Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [courts of appeals], 10 diciembre 2004, “Centro
Juvenil AGES c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 4200–2003 (Chile).
This consistency is remarkable as common lore has it that different panels, or salas,
of Chilean courts never judge alike.
111. C. Apel.,10 diciembre 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 8.
112. C. Apel., 10 diciembre 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 8.
113. C. Apel., 10 diciembre 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 8.
114. C. Apel., 10 diciembre 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 8.
115. C. Apel., 10 diciembre 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 16.
116. Cassation is the final review of judicial decisions by the highest court in a civil law
system. It was created in France in the nineteenth century. While plaintiffs have a
right to be heard by a court of appeals, they do not have a right to have their
cassation application heard by the highest court. But, unlike certiorari jurisdiction,
cassation is not, strictly speaking, discretionary. Cassation must be requested when
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sided with the plaintiffs on the standing issue, but added that “this does not
necessarily mean that their demand must succeed.”117 In fact, the Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and concluded that “it has not been
substantiated in this procedure that the drug in question causes abortions
nor that its use can cause, with certainty, a threat to the life of the un-
born.”118 The Court found that the Institute of Public Health was author-
ized to issue the administrative act at stake.119
Defeated in ordinary courts, the anti-pill litigants shifted to new legal
strategies. In January 2006, Centro Juvenil Ages, the organization created by
Juan Enrique Jara for the purpose of challenging the legality of the pill,120
presented a civil liability lawsuit against Grünenthal, the main pharmaceuti-
cal company importing the pill.121 Shortly thereafter, the company with-
drew its product Postinor-2 from the market and resigned its license.122
Then, in September 2006, the importer of TACE, the other brand of the
pill, also retired its product from the shelves.123 Despite the fact that the
latest Supreme Court ruling declared the pill legal,124 ACONOR, another
the applicant argues successfully that the court of first instance or the court of ap-
peals have based their decision on an error of law. Through a cassation appeal, the
Supreme Court can “quash judicial decisions based either on a mistaken interpreta-
tion of the law or on a failure to observe the rules of procedure,” a power that is
“strictly regulated: decisions had to be reasoned and could only be exercised against a
limited number of Court of Appeals’ judgments.” FAÚNDEZ, supra note 12, at 136.
117. Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 28 noviembre 2005, “Centro
Juvenil AGES c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 1039–2005, slip op. at
§ 22 (Chile).
118. C.S.J., 28 noviembre 2005, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 34.
119. C.S.J., 28 noviembre 2005, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op. at § 34. For a critique
of the Supreme Court opinion regarding its understanding of the legal status of the
unborn, see Antonio Bascuñán, Después de la Pı́ldora, 2 ANUARIO DE DERECHOS
HUMANOS 235 (2006) (Chile).
120. Lorena Letelier & Ana Marı́a Morales, Nuevo fallo prohı́be venta de la “pı́ldora del dı́a
después,” CATHOLIC.NET (1 julio 2004), http://es.catholic.net/imprimir/index.phtml
?ts=22&ca=285&te=706&id=18349 (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). As the source puts
it:
Because of the public debate caused by the first lawsuit against the drug, the
lawyers opted this time for maintaining a low profile. In consequence, Jorge
Reyes stopped being the claimant and left Centro Juvenil Ages, chaired by
Juan Enrique Jara, law student at the University of Los Andes, as the spon-
sor of the request.
Id.
121. Lidia Casas Becerra, La saga de la anticoncepción: de emergencia en Chile: avances y
desafı́os, 2 DOCUMENTOS ELECTRÓNICOS PROGRAMA GÉNERO Y EQUIDAD 5 (2008)
(Chile).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 6.
124. C.S.J., 28 noviembre 2005, “Centro Juvenil AGES,” slip op.
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consumer association created by Juan Enrique Jara,125 sent letters to drug-
stores informing them that selling the pill was illegal.126
These strategies caused a shortage of the pill, which the government
sought to solve in several ways. As one method, the government fined some
drugstores that had no emergency contraception in their inventory. As an-
other method, the government instructed the public health system, com-
posed of state and municipal hospitals, to provide women with the pill. In
addition the Ministry of Health issued an administrative order, Exempt
Resolution Nº 584,127 enacting a code of standards and practices in repro-
ductive matters for the health sector: the National Norms on the Regulation
of Fertility (NNRF).128 This action, however, gave the anti-pill advocates a
new legal and political target: the exempt resolution issued by the Ministry
of Health. This move had important jurisdictional and political conse-
quences because it allowed the anti-pill movement to shift from the ordi-
nary jurisdiction of Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court to the
institution designed to adjudicate conflicts regarding the powers of each
branch of government: the Constitutional Tribunal.129
III. ANTI-PILL PYRRHIC VICTORIES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL
Moving to the Constitutional Tribunal gave the anti-pill movement
more stable terrain on which to advance. Many of the members of the Tri-
bunal were constitutional law professors at Catholic law schools and there-
125. Casas observes that Juan Jara, president of Centro Juvenil Ages, was at the same time
vice-president of ACONOR. Casas Becerra, supra note 121, at 8.
126. CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS UNIVERSIDAD DIEGO PORTALES, INFORME
ANUAL SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS EN CHILE 2008 343 (2009).
127. Ministerio de Salud, APRUEBA NORMAS NACIONALES SOBRE REGULACIÓN DE LA
FERTILIDAD, RESOLUCIÓN EXENTA N° 584 , Sept. 1, 2006 (Chile). In Chilean ad-
ministrative law, an exempt resolution (resolución exenta) is an administrative act that
is not reviewed preemptively by the General Comptroller. Numerically, most admin-
istrative acts are exempt from this preemptive review. See FAÚNDEZ, supra note 12, at
117.
128. GOBIERNO DE CHILE, MINISTERIO DE SALUD, NORMAS NACIONALES SOBRE LA
REGULACIÓN DE LA FERTILIDAD (2006).
129. Pablo Zalaquett, mayor of La Florida, made a prior but unsuccessful attempt to
challenge the NNRF through a constitutional rights injunction, claiming that it was
illegal and that it violated the right of parents to educate their children on sex mat-
ters. See Corte de Apelaciones [C. Apel.] [court of appeals], 10 noviembre 2006,
“Corporación Municipal de Educación y Salud de la Florida c. Ministerio de Salud,”
Rol de la causa: 4693–2006 (Chile). On appeal, the Supreme Court refrained from
ruling because in the meantime the Constitutional Tribunal had declared Exempt
Resolution Nº 584 unconstitutional. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Su-
preme Court], 25 enero 2007, “Corporación Municipal de Educación y Salud de la
Florida con Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 6237–2006 (Chile).
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fore likely to be supporters of natural law constitutionalism.130 The Tribunal
was more prone to the substantive forms of constitutional reasoning that
favored the anti-pill movement over the procedural formalism that had pro-
tected emergency contraception. This favorable scenario secured two mo-
mentous rulings for the anti-pill crusade.131 Nevertheless, as we will see in
the next Part, the two anti-pill victories in this venue were not the last word
on emergency contraception in the Chilean legal system; indeed, they were
not even the last word from the Constitutional Tribunal.132
On September 30, 2006, thirty-one lower house congressmen of the
National Renewal (Renovación Nacional, RN) and UDI parties133 petitioned
the Tribunal to declare Exempt Resolution Nº 584 unconstitutional.134 The
anti-pill Congressional front advanced two main arguments. First, they ob-
jected to the Ministry of Health’s use of an exempt resolution—a lower
form of regulatory power135—arguing that this normative instrument had
been chosen to avoid its reviewability by administrative courts; even though
“the most radically significant individual rights that our Constitution recog-
nizes are at stake.”136 Second, and relatedly, the congressmen claimed that
Resolution Nº 584’s authorization of the morning-after pill violated the
130. Members of the Constitutional Tribunal that taught at Catholic law schools and
that, in my opinion, subscribe to a Catholic natural law understanding of constitu-
tional law include three of its recent Presidents: José L. Cea (2005–2007), Raúl
Bertelsen (2011–2013), and Marisol Peña (2013–2015). See Integración Histórica,
TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL CHILE, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/wp/tribu-
nal/integracion-historica (last visited Feb. 5, 2014).
131. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 11 enero 2007, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad de la
Resolución Exenta N° 584 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 591–2006, slip
op. at § 33 (Chile); Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest
court on constitutional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucion-
alidad del Decreto Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa:
740–2007, slip op. at § 40 (Chile).
132. Infra Part III.
133. While the elements that formed the UDI and still constitute its leadership were the
followers of Jaime Guzmán and the Chicago Boys, RN also boasts continuity with
the National Party (1967–1973) and through it, with the traditional parties of the
Chilean elite, the Conservative and Liberal Parties. For an in-depth study of the
historical background, ideological outlook, and electoral successes of these parties,
see POLLACK, supra note 22, and VERÓNICA VALDIVIA, NACIONALES Y GREMIALIS-
TAS: EL “PARTO” DE LA NUEVA DERECHA POLÍTICA CHILENA 1964–1973  (2008).
134. Only congressmen can petition the Constitutional Tribunal to perform an abstract
constitutional review of executive acts. Private parties can only request a concrete
constitutional review, to be performed in the context of a pending case before an-
other court. See supra notes 47, 67.
135. See supra note 43.
136. DEDUCEN REQUERIMIENTO DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD CONTRA DECRETO
SUPREMO (SIC) QUE SEÑALAN 3 (30 septiembre 2006) (Chile).
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right to life of the fetus, a right they traced back to the writings of Roman
jurists.137
In its January 11, 2007 decision, the Tribunal embraced the anti-pill
plaintiffs’ more positivistic arguments. The Tribunal declared that because
of the matters that Exempt Resolution Nº 584 regulated—matters which
the majority left unidentified, but that the dissenters identified as funda-
mental rights138—Exempt Resolution Nº 584 was actually a decree, a form
of regulatory power of higher rank and therefore greater reviewability.
Moreover, since it lacked the signature of the President, the Tribunal de-
clared it unconstitutional.139 Thus, “having declared that Exempt Resolu-
tion No. 584 has a formal flaw that entails its formal unconstitutionality,
this Court shall refrain from ruling on other possible unconstitutional flaws
presented in the petition.”140 The three dissenting judges argued that ad-
ministrative resolutions do not become supreme decrees if they regulate
constitutional rights and that the Constitutional Tribunal lacked jurisdic-
tion to review the constitutionality of resolutions.141
The Executive’s reaction to this ruling followed the pattern of legal
resistance. As if following the Tribunal’s suggestion,142 on January 26, 2007
President Michelle Bachelet signed Supreme Decree No. 48,143 enacting the
same National Norms on the Regulation of Fertility that Exempt Resolution
No. 584 intended to enact. Supreme Decree No. 48 gave new and adequate
legal support to the governmental policies on the matter, including the
power to distribute the pill through the public health system. In response,
the anti-pill congressional bloc filed a new petition before the Constitu-
137. DEDUCEN REQUERIMIENTO DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD CONTRA DECRETO
SUPREMO (SIC) QUE SEÑALAN 3 (30 septiembre 2006) (Chile).
138. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 11 enero 2007, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad de la
Resolución Exenta N° 584 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 591–2006, slip
op. at § 33 (Chile).
139. T.C., 11 enero 2007, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad de la Resolución Ex-
enta N° 584 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at § 33.
140. T.C., 11 enero 2007, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad de la Resolución Ex-
enta N° 584 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at § 61 (second ruling).
141. T.C., 11 enero 2007, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad de la Resolución Ex-
enta N° 584 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip dissenting op., at ¶  6 (Colombo, Voda-
novic, Correa & Fernández, JJ., dissenting).
142. Bachelet firmará Decreto Supremo para restituir la entrega de la pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO
ONLINE (12 enero 2007, 2:26 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2007/
01/12/242028/bachelet-firmara-decreto-supremo-para-restituir-la-entrega-de-la-
pildora.html (Chile).
143. MINISTERIO DE SALUD, APRUEBA TEXTO QUE ESTABLECE LAS NORMAS NACIONALES
SOBRE REGULACIÓN DE LA FERTILIDAD, DECRETO Nº 48 (26 enero 2007) (Chile).
The Supreme Decree was reviewed and approved by the General Comptroller on
February 2, 2007.
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tional Tribunal requesting constitutional review of Supreme Decree No.
48.144 The congressmen argued that the Decree, an administrative act re-
stricting the right to life of the embryo, exceeded the President’s author-
ity.145 They argued that, under the Chilean Constitution, only properly
enacted legislation could regulate the legal status of the embryo.146 The
President argued that her constitutional duty was to implement public poli-
cies for everyone, regardless of their moral convictions. This responsibility
entailed making emergency contraceptives available while respecting the
personal beliefs and values of everyone.147
A ruling by the Tribunal declaring the pill unconstitutional was offi-
cially announced on April 4, 2008, well before the text was ready for its
public release—an unprecedented practice for this court.148 On April 18,
the Tribunal released the 276-page opinion.149 In its decision, the majority
adopted a more substantive focus than it had in the Exempt Resolution No.
584 decision.150 For the majority, the core of the dispute was whether the
text of the National Norms on the Regulation of Fertility clashed with vari-
ous constitutional clauses, particularly with the right to life established in
Article 19 Nº 1.151 Nevertheless, the decision also had a procedural or for-
malistic dimension that limited its impact on existing contraceptive meth-
ods. The Tribunal declared that the public health system’s distribution of
144. DEDUCEN REQUERIMIENTO DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD CONTRA DECRETO
SUPREMO QUE SEÑALAN (3 marzo 2007) (Chile) (petition to Constitutional Tribu-
nal filed by Lower House Congressmen).
145. Id. at 33.
146. Id. at 33.
147. MICHELLE BACHELET JERIA, PRESIDENTA DE LA REPÚBLICA ET AL., FORMULA OB-
SERVACIONES A REQUERIMIENTO 92 (10 abril 2007) (Chile).
148. Oficial: Tribunal Constitucional prohı́be entrega de la pı́ldora del dı́a después, EL MER-
CURIO ONLINE (4 abril 2008, 2:10 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2008/04/04/299210/oficial-tribunal-constitucional-prohibe-entrega-de-la-pildora-
del-dia-despues.html (Chile).
149. TC notifica fallo sobre “pı́ldora del dı́a después” que prohı́be su distribución en sistema
público, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (18 abril 2008, 9:17 PM), http://www.emol.com/
noticias/nacional/2008/04/18/301022/tc-notifica-fallo-sobre-pildora-del-dia-
despues-que-prohibe-su-distribucion-en-sistema-publico.html (Chile). To my knowl-
edge, at the moment of its release it was the longest opinion of the Tribunal in its
history.
150. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 11 enero 2007, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad de la
Resolución Exenta N° 584 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 591–2006
(Chile).
151. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto
Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 740–2007, slip op. at
§ 40 (Chile).
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the pill was unconstitutional on the substantive grounds that this form of
contraception can affect the constitutionally protected right to life of the
fetus. However, it refrained from banning other mechanisms, such as in-
trauterine devices, that can produce similar abortifacient effects. The proce-
dural reason for this restrained conclusion, in the face of the substantial
similarity between emergency contraception and intrauterine devices, was
that the petition was directed only against the Supreme Decree that ordered
the public health system to distribute the pill.152 One can only wonder
whether this conclusion was a deliberate attempt on the part of the majority
to minimize the impact of this ruling on well-established reproductive
health practices.153
With respect to the morning-after pill, the opinion concluded that
there was a “lack of consensus between the specialists” resulting in a “lack of
certainty about one of the possible consequences of the emergency contra-
ception, i.e., whether it prevents the implantation of a human being.”154
Nonetheless, the Tribunal considered that “the equivalence that could exist,
in a first analysis, between the divergent positions of the specialists that had
provided evidence to this case” was undermined by the fact that “one of
these positions leads to an unconstitutional result while the other does
not.”155 Effectively, the Tribunal employed precautionary reasoning in the
face of what it characterized as the scientific uncertainty of the effects of
levonorgestrel.156
It is important to note that the main justificatory shortcoming of this
decision was its inability to identify the other constitutional interests at play
in this case. On the one hand, the Administration has an interest in having
an efficient public health policy; on the other, women have an interest in
exercising their reproductive autonomy and to count on adequate means for
doing so. The Tribunal did not discuss these interests in its opinion, despite
the fact that the Ministry of Health and organizations of pill users had
152. T.C., 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at § 12 (second ruling).
153. Intrauterine devices have been given to Chilean women by the public health system
since the early 1960s. In fact, a Chilean physician, Jaime Zipper, created the copper
IUD in the early 1970s.
154. T.C., 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at § 36.
155. T.C., 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at § 64.
156. For a critique of the standards of proofs employed by the Tribunal in this respect, see
Daniela Accatino Stagliotti, Una Duda Nada Razonable, 21 REVISTA DE DERECHO
(VALDIVIA) 160 (2007) (Chile).
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articulated them.157 Both detractors and sympathizers criticized the Tribu-
nal’s decision for failing to discuss these aspects.158 For Vivanco, a professor
at the Pontifical Catholic University and a supporter of the ruling,159 it was
a deficit that could have been easily fixed without altering the outcome by
balancing the rights to life and reproductive autonomy.160 But from the
perspective of reproductive rights, the written opinion not only failed to
deliver discursive recognition to women and their needs but also failed to
substantively protect their interests. After all, women protesting the decision
sported banners saying, “Take your rosaries off our ovaries!”—not “Write a
balancing test into your opinions!”161
In order to uncover the power networks at play in this decision, I want
to focus on two secondary aspects of the written opinion: its cursory dismis-
sal of Justices Enrique Navarro and Raúl Bertelsens’ recusals and its charac-
terization of Chilean constitutional scholarship as fundamentally “pro-life.”
This analysis will illustrate the professional power structures reflected in this
decision.
The Tribunal dealt with the recusal of Justices Enrique Navarro and
Raúl Bertelsen before discussing the substance of the main legal issue. This
decision directly impacted the Tribunal’s composition and thus arguably
influenced the outcome of the dispute. In 2003 both Navarro and Bertelsen
signed an amicus brief entitled The right to life as an entitlement: Some con-
siderations concerning the marketing of the drug levonorgestrel 0.75, which ar-
gued that emergency contraception was unconstitutional. The brief was
157. T.C., 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at VI.2, X.2, Title II (“Personas que han
hecho presentaciones en contra del requerimiento”) § 1.
158. See Andrés Bordalı́ Salamanca & Yanira Zúñiga Añazco, Análisis del fallo del Tribunal
Constitucional sobre la pı́ldora del dı́a después, 5 ANUARIO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS
173, 177 (2009) (Chile) (remarking that “a transversal characteristic of the decision
is its failure to consider women as holders of rights”); see also Ángela Vivanco Martı́-
nez, La Pı́ldora del Dı́a Después: Sentencia de Tribunal Constitucional de 11 de enero de
2007, 35 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 543, 567 (2008) (noticing the absence in
the opinion of a consideration “of whether the option for the precautionary protec-
tion of human life amounted to the impairment of other rights involved”).
159. Vivanco Martı́nez, supra note 158, at 543.
160. Vivanco Martı́nez, supra note 158, at 569 (arguing that the Tribunal did not “prefer
a right over other rights, but rather . . . it has been decided that the essence of sexual
and reproductive rights, of the exercise of autonomy and freedom of conscience, do
not reach, in their magnitude, the [intensity of the] possible harm to the life of a
third party, [the fetus,] in its condition of person and holder of rights”).
161. Veinte detenidos deja manifestación por eventual prohibición de la pı́ldora, EL MER-
CURIO ONLINE (3 abril 2008, 2:51 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2008/04/03/299047/veinte-detenidos-deja-manifestacion-por-eventual-prohibicion-
de-la-pildora.html (including a picture of a large ensign with the shape of an ovary).
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filed in support of the request for annulling the pill’s authorization.162 The
amicus was highly partisan, describing the distribution of the pill as “an
assault on the Constitution.”163 Thus, a group of congressmen supporting
emergency contraception argued that the two Justices must recuse them-
selves for having previously issued an opinion on the matter that had come
under their cognizance.164 While Justice Navarro chose to recuse himself,165
Justice Bertelsen declared that his participation in the amicus did not pro-
162. Acompaña Informe en Derecho: a modo puramenta ilustrativo y testimonial at 6 and
10, Juzgados Civiles (J. Civ.) (civil courts), 30 junio 2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES c.
Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa: 5839-2002 (Chile) (brief by Alejandro
Romero on behalf of Centro Juvenil AGES); Informe en Derecho: El Derecho a la
Vida y su Titularidad. Algunas Consideraciones a Propósito de la Comercialización
de la Droga Levonorgestrel 0.75, , Juzgados Civiles (J. Civ.) (civil courts), 30 junio
2004, “Centro Juvenil AGES c. Instituto de Salud Pública,” Rol de la causa:
5839–2002 (Chile) (brief by Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, et. al. as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Salud Pública).
163. Brief by Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, et. al. as Amici Curiae for Salud Pública, supra
note 162. Interestingly, the amicus bound together not only professors widely recog-
nized as right-leaning, but also prominent Christian Democrats, bridging two sec-
tions of the political spectrum—the Catholic Center and the Catholic Right—that
had been separated since the Military Regime. The conservative camp included Raúl
Bertelsen, whose tenure in the Constitutional Tribunal we will soon discuss; Eduardo
Soto, who has written extensively in praise of the 1980 Constitution and in criticism
of redistributionist policies; Sergio Carrasco, author of a laudatory biography of con-
servative President Jorge Alessandri; and Arturo Fermandois, UDI member, and ap-
pointee as Ambassador to the United States by President Sebastián Piñera in 2010.
The PDC group included Alejandro Silva, founding member of the PDC; Francisco
Cumplido, Minister of Justice of President Patricio Aylwin; and Patricio Zapata, who
worked in the same administration for various members of the Cabinet. It should be
noted that Alejandro Silva formed part of the Commission for the Study of a New
Constitution between 1973 and 1977, a body appointed by the Military Junta to
draft a new constitutional text. At that time he advocated, together with Jaime Guz-
mán, for a wording of the right to life clause that would have completely banned
therapeutic abortion, which was legal in Chile at the time. See Comisión de Estudios
de la Nueva Constitución, 90th Session, November 25, 1974 (Chile).
164. T.C., April 18, 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op., at X.2. § 4; see also Jorge Contesse Singh,
Implicancias y Recusaciones: el caso del Tribunal Constitucional. Informe en derecho
sobre la inhabilidad constitucional para conocer de un caso en el que se ha vertido opin-
ión pública con anterioridad, 2 REVISTA IUS ET PRAXIS 391, 391 (2013) (Chile) (brief
presented in support of the congressmen’s recusal petition).
165. A source has suggested to me, off the record, that Navarro might have recused him-
self due to the fact that, having been appointed to the Tribunal by the Supreme
Court, he did not want to alienate anyone in that organ in this highly sensitive
matter. Having been appointed by the Right in Congress, Bertelsen would not have
felt constrained in the same way. Private interview with an anonymous source (Nov.
2010).
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vide enough ground for his recusal,166 thus taking part in the hearings, an
action that earned him strong criticism from feminist movements and pro-
gressive politicians.167
As in the case of our earlier biographical sketches, Justice Bertelsen’s
profile demonstrates the links between different networks of influence and
power, in this case between religious and academic groups. On June 9,
1977, during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship, Justice Bertelsen became a
member of the Commission for the Study of a New Constitution, the advi-
sory legal team appointed by the Military Junta to draft what later became
the 1980 Constitution.168 He also chaired the legislative committee estab-
lished by the Junta in 1983 that prepared its organic constitutional laws.169
As a member of the Opus Dei, Bertelsen’s academic life has taken place
almost exclusively in Catholic institutions. At the Catholic University of
Valparaiso he obtained his bachelor of laws, taught as a professor, and served
as President from 1983 to 1985.170 He received his doctorate from the Opus
Dei University of Navarra, Spain, and he served as President of the Opus
Dei University of Los Andes, Chile between 1988 and 2000, where he re-
mains a professor to date.171
Bertelsen’s arrival on the Constitutional Tribunal signifies his connec-
tion with the political front. His seat on the Tribunal was part of a political
bargain in the Senate that simultaneously placed one Justice of the Right
and one of the Center-Left coalition.172 A group of academics questioned
his appointment arguing that “[b]esides technical skills, people in whose
hands the Republic puts the defense of the Constitution must have demon-
166. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto
Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 740–2007, slip op. at § X
(Chile).
167. TC: Miembros rechazaron inhabilitar a Bertelsen en fallo sobre pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO
ONLINE (8 abril 2008, 2:00 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2008/04/
08/299672/tc-miembros-rechazaron-inhabilitar-a-bertelsen-en-fallo-sobre-pildora
.html (Chile).
168. Presidente, Raúl Bertelsen Repetto, TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL DE CHILE, http://




171. Id. For more information on the Universities of Navarra and Los Andes, see supra
note 48.
172. Senado aprueba a abogados Bertelsen y Vodanovic para Tribunal Constitucional, EL
MERCURIO ONLINE (8 noviembre 2005, 6:20 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/
nacional/2005/11/08/201007/senado-aprueba-a-abogados-bertelsen-y-vodanovic-
para-tribunal-constitucional.html (Chile).
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strated their loyalty to the [democratic] principles that inspire it.”173 Ber-
telsen’s participation “in drafting the 1980 Constitution and in the
formulation of the legislation enacted between 1983 and 1989 in order to
preserve the institutions of the military regime,”174 in their opinion, contra-
dicted that democratic commitment. However, their criticism only man-
aged to stir up support for Bertelsen from other academics.175 Ultimately,
on August 9, 2011, the other Justices elected Bertelsen President of the
Constitutional Tribunal. In earlier ballot rounds he had tied twice with so-
cialist Francisco Fernández.176
Bertelsen’s religious and academic affiliations reflect the hegemony of
natural law constitutionalism in the Chilean legal system. The Constitu-
tional Tribunal further reinforced natural law constitutionalism by endors-
ing the pro-life framework as the correct way of interpreting the
Constitution, as opposed to other possible juristic readings of the same text.
In fact, the Court declared, “a majority of Chilean constitutional scholars,
unlike professors from other legal fields, believe that the constitutional pro-
tection of the person begins at the moment of conception.”177 This was an
explicit reference to the debate held in 2004 at the influential think tank
Centro de Estudios Públicos between constitutional law professor Arturo
Fermandois and criminal law professor Antonio Bascuñán.178
173. Open letter from Professor Fernando Atria et al., (Nov. 18, 2005) (on file with
author).
174. Open letter from Professor Fernando Atria et al., supra note 173. . The newspaper El
Mercurio described the letter as a “liberal assault on the Constitutional Tribunal.”
Arremetida Liberal en el TC, EL MERCURIO, 20 noviembre 2005, at A2 (Chile). For
an analysis of the whole conflict, see Fernando Muñoz León, Not Only ‘Who Decides’:
The Rhetoric of Conflicts over Judicial Appointments, 14 GERMAN L. J. 1195 (2013).
175. See, e.g., Hugo Herrera, Nombramiento de Bertelsen II, EL MERCURIO, 24 noviembre
2005, at A2 (Chile); Juan Terrazas, Nombramiento de Bertelsen, EL MERCURIO, 23
noviembre 2005 (Chile); Patricio Zapata, Nombramiento de Raúl Bertelsen, EL MER-
CURIO, 25 noviember 2005 (Chile); Francisco Zúñiga, Enrique Navarro, Eugenio
Evans & Arturo Fermandois, Respaldo a Bertelsen, EL MERCURIO, 27 noviembre
2005, at A2 (Chile).
176. Presidente electo del TC: Fallos son argumentados y públicos, no polı́ticos, EL MER-
CURIO, 10 agosto 2011 (Chile).
177. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto
Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 740-2007, slip op. at § 49
(Chile).
178. The presentations of the professors were later published in the journal edited by
Centro de Estudios Públicos. See Arturo Fermandois, La pı́ldora del dı́a después: as-
pectos normativos, 95 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS 91 (2004) (Chile); Antonio Bascuñán
Rodrı́guez, La pı́ldora del dı́a después ante la jurisprudencia, 95 ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS
43 (2004) (Chile).
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In the published version of that debate, Fermandois, a professor at
Catholic University and a member of the UDI, tried to secure a privileged
position for pro-life interpretations of the Constitution. He declared that he
would speak from a position that he had labeled “real constitutionalism,”
for which the Constitution “is a juridical norm properly speaking, endowed
with all of its attributes: binding and coercive, requiring or permiting cer-
tain state conducts, and whose consequences can be unraveled objectively
through a system of interpretation.”179 He claimed that in contrast to this
approach stood the school of “hypothetical constitutionalism,” for which
“the Constitution is a mere parameter, flexible and mutable, that serves as a
simple reference to the exercise of state power.”180 This latter form of rea-
soning, Fermandois claimed, “is not, thus, constitutional law, but rather
political science, or in some cases political philosophy. These are respectable
and prestigious areas of knowledge that nurture the law and influence it, but
that are essentially different from it in the sense that I have pointed out.”181
In sum, for Fermandois his own knowledge was real and binding, while that
of his opponents was hypothetical and not binding. And so, Fermandois
announced his interpretation of Article 19 Nº 1 of the Constitution.182 He
contended that “the strong language used in this Article is clearly structured
towards the protection of those ‘about to be born.’”183 For Fermandois, this
meant that in Chilean constitutional law, there existed “a strong protective
principle”184 in favor of the fetus.185
Bascuñán offered an alternative interpretation of Article 19 Nº 1. For
him, “the specific context of the regulation expresses an unequivocal distinc-
tion between persons and the unborn.”186 While persons held “a public sub-
jective right, the right to life, effective even against legislation,”187 the “life
of the unborn, rather, is an object of protection commended to the legisla-
tor.”188 Any other reading, argued Bascuñán, would render the second line
of Article 19 Nº 1 either irrelevant or arbitrary.189 It should be noted that,
by distinguishing between a right and an object of protection, Bascuñán
179. Fermandois, supra note 178, at 92.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 93.
182. C.P. art. 19 (Chile) (“The Constitution guarantees to all persons: The right to life
and to the physical and psychological integrity of persons. The law protects the life
of those about to be born.”).
183. Fermandois, supra note 178, at 102.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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creates a space for the judicial balancing of the competing interests at stake;
that space remains closed if one refuses to see any internal distinction within
Article 19 Nº 1. This distinction, he maintained, “is supported by parts of
criminal law scholarship”190 and has “a solid foundation in the history of
the establishment of the constitutional text.”191 In sum, for Bascuñán, Arti-
cle 19 Nº 1 “makes of the life of the unborn an object of protection, with-
out assigning the unborn a right to life.”192
Bascuñán’s argument reveals the existence of alternative readings of
Article 19 Nº 1 within Chilean legal academia. The Tribunal’s intervention,
however, excluded that interpretation by declaring the primacy of what
“constitutional scholarship has held” over “what professors from other legal
fields believe,”193 thus reaffirming the hegemony of natural law
constitutionalism.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE COMEBACK OF THE PILL
The impact of the Tribunal’s decision was constrained by formalistic
considerations, specifically by the fact that it targeted a specific document,
Supreme Decree No. 48.194 The Tribunal itself noted the limited impact of
the ruling when it stated that intrauterine devices were not affected.195 The
restrained decision undermined public faith in the Tribunal, as it also im-
plied that the pill could still be bought from private vendors and was there-
fore still available for those who could afford it. For example, President
Bachelet, while observing that the pill still could be bought at drugstores,
chastised the decision as a “hard blow to women that use the public health
services” and a “step back in terms of equality.”196 Additionally, many critics
190. Id. at 62. Bascuñán discusses the following criminal law treatises: ALFREDO ETCH-
EBERRY, DERECHO PENAL (1998) (Chile); MARIO GARRIDO, DERECHO PENAL,
PARTE ESPECIAL (1999) (Chile); and SERGIO POLITOFF, FRANCISCO GRISOLÍA &
JUAN BUSTOS, DERECHO PENAL CHILENO, PARTE ESPECIAL (1993) Chile). Id. at
62, 79, 81.
191. Id. at 62.
192. Id. at 64.
193. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto
Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 740–2007, slip op. at
243–44 (Chile).
194. T.C., 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at 1.
195. T.C., 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto Supremo
N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” slip op. at 82–83.
196. Bachelet: Fallo del TC es “un retroceso en términos de equidad”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE
(19 abril 2008, 4:36 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2008/04/19/
301089/bachelet-fallo-del-tc-es-un-retroceso-en-terminos-de-equidad.html.
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thought the Tribunal’s decision was an imposition of Catholic values.197
Furthermore, once released, the written opinion—fraught with non-se-
quiturs, fallacies, and gaps in argumentation—complicated the Tribunal’s
position even further. As one commentator put it, the Tribunal “displays
considerable argumentative deficiencies, considering that only one out of
the six points that structure the essence of its reasoning is acceptable.”198
Due to these and other perceptions, Case Nº 740 arguably stands as
the most controversial ruling of the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal since
its reestablishment in 1980. No other decision by this court has stirred so
much public discord and opposition. The decision outraged supporters of
emergency contraception among civil society and the political elite. For
days, hundreds protested the decision at the doors of the Tribunal. On April
22, 2008, over 20,000 people gathered in protest.199 Moreover, wide sec-
tions of society were willing to resist the decision. A poll conducted in the
region of Concepción found that 64.2% of the population believed that the
ruling by the Tribunal should not be obeyed.200 Members of Congress were
called on to resist the decision and to enact a constitutional amendment
guaranteeing the distribution of the pill.201
197. See, e.g., Carlos Moffat, La Pı́ldora del Dı́a Después (Pero la intolerancia es de siempre),
DE LA REPÚBLICA BLOG (4 abril 2008), http://blog.delarepublica.cl/2008/04/04/la-
pildora-del-dia-despues-pero-la-intolerancia-es-de-siempre/ (Chile) (declaring that
the decision “represents the vision of the most intolerant, ignorant, and conservative
among us,” and asserting that the Justices and their allies “attack also the worst off,
creating a new instance of that inequality that their ideas have familiarized us
with.”).
198. Rodolfo Figueroa, Comentario relativo a la sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional refer-
ida a la pı́ldora del dı́a después del año 2008, 1 ANUARIO DE DERECHO PÚBLICO 144,
161 (2010) (Chile).
199. Convocan a marcha contra fallo del TC sobre la “pı́ldora”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (13
abril 2008, 7:41 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2008/04/13/
300297/convocan-a-marcha-contra-fallo-del-tc-sobre-la-pildora.html (Chile); Fallo
del Tribunal Constitucional: Más de 20.000 personas protestan en Chile por la prohibi-
ción de distribuir la pı́ldora postcoital, EL MUNDO (23 abril 2008, 1:14 PM), http://
www.elmundo.es/elmundosalud/2008/04/23/mujer/1208948973.html. To my
knowledge, this was the first time in Chilean history that a ruling by a court had
been the object of a massive protest.
200. Encuesta Pı́ldora del Dı́a Después, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS CORBIOBÍO (abril 2008),
http://www.corbiobio.cl/_cec/encuestas/encuesta-21-04-2008-210408041413.pdf
(Chile).
201. See, e.g., Diputada Mun~oz: Concertación buscará anular fallo por pı́ldora del dı́a
después, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (10 abril 2008, 9:53 AM), http://www.emol.com/
noticias/nacional/2008/04/10/299885/diputada-munoz-concertacion-buscara-anu-
lar-fallo-por-pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile) [hereinafter Concertación buscará
anular]; Ministras se movilizan contra fallo que prohı́be la “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL
MERCURIO ONLINE (6 abril 2008, 5:26 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/na-
cional/2008/04/06/299417/ministras-se-movilizan-contra-fallo-que-prohibe-la-
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Not everyone criticized the Tribunal. Later that year, at the annual
September 18th mass, which commemorates the Independence of Chile,
Archbishop Francisco Javier Errázuriz praised God for the work of the Con-
stitutional Tribunal and the General Comptroller.202 Errázuriz celebrated
them by saying “they work conscientiously, thinking of the common good
of Chile, not fearing the displeasure that their rulings or opinions may
cause, only submitting themselves to the Constitution and our legal or-
der.”203 Two Catholic University constitutional law professors—one from
the PDC, one from the UDI—criticized demonstrators and politicians who
had protested the Tribunal’s decision before the written opinion was re-
leased. They argued that it was necessary to hear the arguments that the
Tribunal had to offer before agreeing or disagreeing with it.204
President Bachelet spearheaded the institutional reaction against the
Tribunal’s decision. Bachelet expressed her belief that the decision inflicted
“a deep wound to building a more just and equitable society, and to giving
more opportunities,” and that it “affects the poorest women of our coun-
try.”205 Karla Rubilar, a RN congresswoman, expressed her dissent from the
majority of her peers in the Right by declaring that she would appeal the
decision before international organizations.206 This option was also consid-
ered by the Minister Secretary General of the Presidency, José Antonio
Viera-Gallo, together with three alternatives: establishing the legality of
emergency contraception through a bill, which would mean engaging in a
new act of legal resistance; appealing the Tribunal’s decision to the same
body, a non-existent procedure; or proposing a constitutional amendment
to declare the distribution of the pill constitutional.207
pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile); PPD junta firmas para apoyar entrega de la
“pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (5 abril 2008, 1:46 PM), http://
www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2008/04/05/299306/ppd-junta-firmas-para-
apoyar-entrega-de-la-pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile).
202. The Office of the General Comptroller (Contralorı́a General de la República) is an
autonomous body that performs a legality review of the regulatory powers of the
Executive and of municipalities. See C.P. ch. IX (Chile).
203. F. Torrealba et al., Arzobispo destaca rol de la Contralorı́a y del Tribunal Constitu-
cional, EL MERCURIO, 18 septiembre 2008, at C4 (Chile).
204. Arturo Fermandois & Patricio Zapata, Tribunal Constitucional, EL MERCURIO, 13
abril 2008, at A2 (Chile).
205. Bernardita Marino, La Presidenta dijo “lamentar profundamente” fallo del TC, EL
MERCURIO, 6 abril 2008, at C9 (Chile).
206. R. Olivares, C. Carvajal & V. Zúñiga, Polémica transversal por eventual fallo del TC
sobre la pı́ldora del dı́a después, EL MERCURIO, 4 abril 2008, available at http://
recortes.iglesia.cl/recorte.php?id=8572 (Chile).
207. Gobierno analiza tres vı́as para reponer la polémica pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO, 8 abril
2008, available at http://recortes.iglesia.cl/recorte.php?id=8577 (Chile).
160 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 21:123
Soon, a less costly strategy was adopted. As we have seen, the procedu-
ral constraints of the Tribunal’s decision left drug-store sales of the pill un-
touched, which the Ministry of Health used to justify the acquisition of
large quantities of the pill.208 Therefore, the Government only had to find a
new channel to supply the pill to poor women. The Ministry of Health
decided that the solution was to have the pill distributed by municipal pub-
lic health departments.209 In fact, the chair of the Chilean Association of
Municipalities declared that it was still legal for them to distribute the
pill.210
A major problem with this method of distribution, however, was that
conservatives who actively opposed the morning-after pill headed many mu-
nicipalities.211 The question then became whether mayors could oppose the
distribution of the pill in their municipalities.212 The Chilean Association of
Municipalities requested the General Comptroller, who is endowed with the
authority to interpret the laws applicable to public institutions, to rule on
whether the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision was applicable to them.213
Anti-pill litigants seized the opportunity to advocate for an expansive inter-
pretation of the ruling.214 The Comptroller’s response came out on June 16,
208. Ministra de Salud Justifica nueva adquisición de dosis de la pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO
ONLINE (8 septiembre 2008, 12:38 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2008/09/08/320983/ministra-de-salud-justifica-nueva-adquisicion-de-dosis-de-la-
pildora.html (Chile).
209. Still, this measure was unsatisfactory as it relied on the discretion of the mayors
heading each municipality. Unsurprisingly, only 50.5% of the municipalities of the
country reported supplying it. See Claudia Dides C., M. Cristina Benavente R. &
Isabel Sáez A., Entrega de la Pı́ldora Anticonceptiva de Emergencia en el Sistema de
Salud Municipal de Chile: Estado de Situacion 2010, FACULTAD LATINOAMERICA DE
CIENCIAS SOCIALES [FLACSO] & CONSORCIO LATINOAMERICANO DE CONCEP-
CIÓN DE EMERGENCIA [CLAE] 8 (2010) (Chile).
210. Presidente de la Asociación de Municipios: Tenemos “autonomı́a” para entregar ‘la
pı́ldora’, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (21 abril 2008, 6:02 PM), http://www.emol.com/
noticias/nacional/2008/04/21/301225/presidente-de-la-asociacion-de-municipios-
tenemos-autonomia-para-entregar-la-pildora.html (Chile).
211. Marı́a Teresa Solinas, Con posturas divididas los alcaldes de la Alianza enfrentan la
entrega de la pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO ONLINE (30 enero 2007, 2:24 PM), http://www
.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2007/01/30/244154/con-posturas-divididas-los-alcal-
des-de-la-alianza-enfrentan-la-entrega-de-la-pildora.html (Chile).
212. Each municipality is headed by a mayor elected by its inhabitants. C.P. art. 118
(Chile).
213. Asociación de Municipalidades respaldará entrega de “Pı́ldora del Dı́a Después”, EL
MERCURIO ONLINE (17 julio 2008, 6:49 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/na-
cional/2008/07/17/313507/asociacion-de-municipalidades-respaldara-entrega-de-
pildora-del-dia-despues.html (Chile).
214. This included a petition by anti-pill activist Jorge Reyes and a brief presented by 37
law professors, headed by the Christian Democrats Alejandro Silva Bascuñán and
Francisco Cumplido Cereceda and the conservative Eduardo Soto Kloss.
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2009; it declared that it was “evident” that the Tribunal’s decision was
“binding for all the organisms, institutions, and civil servants that form part
of the Care Network of the National System of Health Services.”215 There-
fore, in the Comptroller’s interpretation, municipalities fell under the scope
of the Tribunal’s decision. It should be noted that Ramiro Mendoza, the
General Comptroller, had also signed the anti-pill amicus brief presented in
2003 at the public law nullity trial, just like Constitutional Tribunal Justices
Bertelsen and Navarro.216
This ruling marked a watershed event. It extinguished any possibility
of distributing the pill through administrative action. Effectively, the
Comptroller had decided that the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision made
it illegal for any state institution, and even for any private party, to dis-
tribute the pill.217 On June 30, 2009, only two weeks after the Comptrol-
ler’s decision, and after new pro-pill protests,218 President Michelle Bachelet
submitted a bill to Congress for immediate review.219 The proposed legisla-
tion declared that the public health system would make available all contra-
ceptive methods, including emergency contraception, to any person.220
Arguably, to override a decision by the Constitutional Tribunal,
backed by the General Comptroller, the President should have presented a
constitutional amendment rather than a law proposal. But no one argued
so. Instead, by mid-July the proposed law was approved by the Lower
House, with the support of sixteen congressmen of the Right—eleven from
RN and five from UDI. By the end of October the Senate approved it, with




216. Supra note 163, at 9.
217. Cristı́an Farı́as & Paola Aveggio, Contralorı́a prohı́be a municipios entregar la “pı́ldora
del dı́a después”, LA TERCERA (18 junio 2009, 4:30 PM), http://www.latercera.com/
noticia/nacional/2009/06/680-143575-9-contraloria-prohibe-a-municipios-entregar-
pildora-del-dia-despues.shtml (Chile). The Comptroller, should be noted, has no
power over private parties.
218. Cristı́an Farı́as & Paola Aveggio, Protestan en Contralorı́a tras dictamen que impide
distribuir “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, LA TERCERA (22 junio 2009, 3:42 PM), http://
www.latercera.com/noticia/nacional/2009/06/680-145703-9-protestan-en-con-
traloria-tras-dictamen-que-impide-distribuir-pildora-del-dia.shtml (Chile).
219. Mensaje de S.E. la Presidenta de la República con el que inicia un proyecto de ley
sobre información, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fer-
tilidad, Mensaje Nº 667–357 (Junio 30, 2009) (Chile) (bill sent to Congress).
220. Id.
162 M I C H I G A N  J O U R N A L  O F  G E N D E R &  L A W [Vol. 21:123
four votes from National Renewal and two from the Democratic Indepen-
dent Union.221
What explains the urgency with which this bill was presented? What
accounts for its ultimate success? The answer to these questions seems to lie
in the approaching presidential election, which by June 2009, was marching
along at full speed. Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei—presidential candi-
date of the PDC, the PPD, and the Socialist Party—had expressed his sup-
port for emergency contraception, and so had the other progressive
candidates Marco Enrı́quez and Jorge Arrate.222 Frei in particular used the
pill as an electoral argument against RN candidate Sebastián Piñera, to
whom he eventually lost the race.223 Most anti-pill litigants, congressmen,
and law professors were members of UDI, which supported the candidacy
of Piñera.224 But Piñera was trying to win the moderate vote in order to
secure his candidacy, and could not be perceived as part of a conservative
reaction—an image usually projected by UDI activists opposing emergency
contraception.225 As a news report observed, “despite the cost of dividing
the Alianza [the coalition between RN and UDI], Piñera’s polls show that
an immense majority believes that the pill should be made available.”226
My interpretation of the record is that the dynamics of the presidential
competition strengthened the legislative viability of Bachelet’s bill, both in-
221. Con cinco votos UDI, Cámara aprueba proyecto sobre la “pı́ldora”, EL MERCURIO ON-
LINE (15 julio 2009, 2:47 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/2009/07/
15/367315/con-cinco-votos-udi-camara-aprueba-proyecto-sobre-la-pildora.html
(Chile).
222. Both Enrı́quez and Arrate had been members of the Socialist Party until 2009 when
they resigned in order to run for the Presidency. Enrı́quez ran as an independent,
while Arrate became a member of the Communist Party to run as its candidate. See
PC valoró inscripción de Arrate en el partido, COOPERATIVA.CL (13 julio 2009, 2:30
PM), http://www.cooperativa.cl/pc-valoro-inscripcion-de-arrate-en-el-partido/pron-
tus_nots/2009-07-13/143143.html (Chile).
223. Frei acusa a la Alianza de “inconsecuencia inaceptable” en el caso de la “pı́ldora”, EL
MERCURIO ONLINE (4 julio 2009, 11:05 AM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/na-
cional/2009/07/04/365682/frei-acusa-a-la-alianza-de-inconsecuencia-inaceptable-en-
el-caso-de-la-pildora.html (Chile).
224. See supra Part II, note 151. It is interesting to observe that the PDC politicians and
law professors that were opposed to the pill did not become a liability in this regard
for Frei.
225. See Daniela Salinas, Mesa UDI frena documento valórico para no empañar proclama-
cı́on de Piñera, LA TERCERA (21 agosto 2009, 7:55 AM), http://www.latercera.com/
noticia/politica/2009/08/674-171689-9-mesa-udi-frena-documento-valorico-para-
no-empanar-proclamacion-de-pinera.shtml (Chile) (explaining that the UDI re-
frained from publicizing a political manifesto where it criticized emergency contra-
ceptives in order not to harm Piñera’s candidacy).
226. See, e.g., Pilar Molina Armas, La ofensiva del Gobierno con la pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO,
28 junio 2009, at C6 (Chile).
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spiring the bill’s progressive supporters in an effort to differentiate them-
selves from the Right and emboldening the more centrist, secular, or even
pragmatist congressmen of RN and UDI to vote in favor of the pill. For
example, Piñera declared that the Comptroller’s expansive anti-pill ruling
was “absurd” since “it has not been proven that [the pill] is abortive, this is a
decision that each person needs to make conscientiously and freely.”227
Piñera stated that it was “unacceptable that the pill is still sold in drugstores
to the wealthy, and is denied to the needy at the health services offices.”228
In the presidential debate he would go on to say:
[that he would] always defend the value of life, especially of the
children about to be born because of their defenselessness and
innocence, but the pill is not abortive and that is my opinion,
and as long as I think that way the pill will be available not only
in drugstores but also offered freely in public health services
offices.229
Frei criticized Piñera for supporting the pill while most of the congressmen
in his coalition voted against Bachelet’s bill.230 While that was in fact true,
some RN and even a few UDI congressmen voted to approve the bill. In the
words of UDI congressman Juan Lobos, “if [the Government] does not
come as a bulldozer in search of petty electoral gains and they protect pater-
nal authority, this time there will be quorum in the Alianza for approving
the project.”231
This support was secured through dialogue with the Piñera campaign;
thus the bill sent by President Bachelet to Congress was previously checked
with Marı́a Luisa Brahm, Piñera’s senior policy advisor.232 The press re-
ported her declaration that “through legislative amendments they would try
227. Fernando Jiménez, Piñera califica como absurdo fallo sobre “pı́ldora del dı́a después”, EL




229. F. Torrealba & P. Yévenes, Candidatos marcaron sus posturas valóricas en segundo de-
bate presidencial, EL MERCURIO, 10 octubre 2009, at C4 (Chile).
230. Frei acusa a la Alianza de “inconsecuencia inaceptable” en el caso de la “pı́ldora”, EL
MERCURIO ONLINE (4 julio 2009, 11:05 AM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/na-
cional/2009/07/04/365682/frei-acusa-a-la-alianza-de-inconsecuencia-inaceptable-en-
el-caso-de-la-pildora.html (Chile).
231. Molina Armas, supra note 226.
232. See Maria Luisa Brahm, PODEROPEDIA (27 marzo 2013), http://www.poderopedia
.org/personas/Maria_Luisa_Brahm (Chile).
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to provide information to parents or guardians in the case of minors.”233 For
Brahm, substantively respecting parental authority over children was the
price that the bill had to pay in order to be approved. In this regard, the
UDI’s attempt to guarantee the right of parents to be informed about their
children’s use of emergency contraception had been unsuccessful. Two legis-
lative amendments establishing that right, one presented by congressmen
Marı́a Angélica Cristi and Patricio Melero and another presented by Senator
Juan Antonio Coloma, had been rejected successively in the Chamber of
Deputies and the Senate.234 But a new amendment, proposed by RN Sena-
tor Antonio Horvath, reflected the primacy assigned by Brahm to parental
authority, and did so in a way that was also attractive to Center-Left con-
gressmen. It established that “educational institutions recognized by the
State shall include in their High School curriculum a sexual education pro-
gram which, according to their principles and values, shall comprise con-
tents that foster a responsible sexuality and informs in a complete manner
about the various existing and authorized contraceptive methods.”235 Sena-
tors Guido Girardi (PPD), Mariano Ruiz-Esquide (PDC), and Carlos
Ominami (PS) proposed a similarly drafted amendment, and the idea to
combine both proposals emerged.236 Ultimately, the law as approved by
Congress established that the sexual education in schools would be taught
“in accordance with the educational project, convictions and beliefs that
each educational institution teaches and adopts together with their board of
parents.”237
In a way, this outcome was highly paradoxical, as it represented a shift
in the Right’s position on compulsory sexual education in schools.238 Still,
233. Brief by Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, et. al. as Amici Curiae for Salud Pública, supra
note 162. Lobos, in fact, later on would be one of the five UDI congressmen who
voted in favor of the bill.
234. The two proposed legislative amendments were identical. They declared, “these
guidelines can be handed to minors only with the consent of any of their parents or
their legal tutor, expressed previous knowledge of their content.” HISTORIA DE LA
LEY No. 20418, Enero 28, 2010, Fija Normas sobre Información, Orientación y
Prestaciones en materia de regulación de la Fertilidad 69, 302 DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Chile) [hereinafter HISTORIA DE LA LEY No. 20.418].
235. Id. at 302.
236. Id.
237. Law No. 20418, Enero 18, 2010, Fija Normas sobre Información, Orientación y
Prestaciones en materia de regulación de la Fertilidad, art. 1, para. 4 DIARIO OFICIAL
[D.O.] (Chile), available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idLey=20418&idVersion
=2010-01-28.
238. In 1996, the Church and the Right parties energetically protested the Government’s
implementation of a sexual education program in schools known as Days of Conver-
sation about Affects and Sexuality (JOCAS, for its initials in Spanish). As a news
report puts it, “the story of State sexual education is short, and the JOCAS is, to be
sure, its most remembered milestone.” Marcela Escobar Q., Cómo se enseña sexo en los
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the law let schools decide what kind of sexual education it would teach, a
solution that appealed to Catholic principles of freedom of teaching and
parental authority. We will soon see how important this aspect was for the
conservative members of the Constitutional Tribunal.
One reaction to the idea of amending the bill to include a reference to
sexual education in schools is particularly noteworthy. Then Minister Secre-
tary General of the Presidency José Antonio Viera-Gallo, who was present at
the session where the idea first emerged, observed that the bill as it stood
did not contemplate “matters related to education” and therefore the pro-
posed amendment was a “norm that exceeds the scope of the bill.”239 This
would be problematic in light of Article 69 of the Constitution, which bans
the introduction of amendments that have no “direct connection with the
central or fundamental ideas of the bill.”240 Furthermore, as Viera-Gallo
observed, establishing a curricular mandate for schools could “imply its pre-
emptive review by the Constitutional Tribunal,”241 resulting in its delay
and—perhaps Viera-Gallo might have thought—even in the declaration
that the whole bill was unconstitutional.
In spite of this word of caution, the members of the Senate’s Commit-
tee on Health unanimously approved the inclusion of this amendment.242
But, as Viera-Gallo had foreseen, the inclusion of educational matters in the
bill meant that once it had been approved by both Houses it had to be sent
to the Constitutional Tribunal for a preemptive review, giving this body a
colegios: A diez años de la polémica de las Jocas, EL SÁBADO, 29 abril 2006 (Chile).
The Ministry of Education began the JOCAS program in 1993, but the program
became an issue of public contestation only in 1996 when El Mercurio published a
sensationalist story entitled “The New Sexual Education of the State” that described,
among other things, performances by students simulating sexual intercourse and pos-
ters depicting young men masturbating in an explosion of semen. A picture of two
school students holding condoms accompanied the news story. It was soon discov-
ered that the photographer had given the condoms to the girls for the picture—the
JOCAS did not provide students with them. In any case the propagandistic effect
was achieved; the very day of the publication, the ultraconservative bishop Jorge
Medina attacked the Minister of Education, with the RN and UDI chairmen joining
in his criticism. See Pilar Molina, La Nueva Educación Sexual del Estado, EL MER-
CURIO, 8 septiembre 1996, at D1 (Chile); CLAUDIA LAGOS LIRA, ABORTO EN
CHILE: EL DEBER DE PARIR 72 (2001).
239. HISTORIA DE LA LEY No. 20.418, supra note 234, at 312.
240. C.P. art. 66 (Chile).
241. SENADO DE CHILE, SEGUNDO INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN DE SALUD RECAÍDO EN EL
PROYECTO DE LEY, EN SEGUNDO TRÁMITE CONSTITUCIONAL, SOBRE INFORMA-
CIÓN, ORIENTACIÓN Y PRESTACIONES EN MATERIA DE REGULACIÓN DE LA FER-
TILIDAD (2009).
242. INFORMACIÓN, ORIENTACIÓN Y PRESTACIONES EN MATERIA DE REGULACIÓN DE
LA FERTILIDAD: SENADO DE CHILE: DISCUSIÓN PARTCULAR APROBADO CON
MODIFICACIONES Legislatura 357a, Sesión 76a (Deciembre 16, 2009).
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third opportunity to make its voice heard on this issue. Once the legislative
process was completed, the President of the Lower House and UDI mem-
ber, Rodrigo Álvarez, announced that he would send the bill to the Consti-
tutional Tribunal for its preemptive review of constitutionality.243 Article 93
of the Constitution entrusts the Tribunal with reviewing “prior to their pro-
mulgation” the constitutionality of organic constitutional laws—a category
of laws that requires a supermajoritarian quorum of four sevenths for ap-
proval, and that includes not only the regulation of education but also of
various other matters such as political parties, states of exception, the Mili-
tary Forces, and the Central Bank.244
All along the enemies of the pill had considered challenging the bill
before the Constitutional Tribunal.245 José Antonio Kast had announced
that if the Executive submitted a bill on the issue for legislative discussion,
he would “gather the thirty signatures [of congressmen] that are needed to
go to the Constitutional Tribunal.”246 Jorge Sabag, a PDC congressman and
a member of the Opus Dei, declared in an interview that he was “willing to
resort to the Constitutional Tribunal to enforce the Rule of Law.”247 During
the legislative process, UDI congressmen Patricio Melero and Marcelo
Forni, along with UDI Senator Jorge Arancibia, also articulated their inten-
tion to challenge the bill before the Constitutional Tribunal.248 But ulti-
mately, as President of the Lower House Rodrigo Álvarez explained via
Twitter, “no one objected [to] this: neither in the floor of the Senate, nor in
243. Proyecto de pı́ldora del dı́a después será revisado por el Tribunal Constitucional, EL MER-
CURIO ONLINE (6 enero 2010, 6:08 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2010/01/06/392620/proyecto-de-pildora-del-dia-despues-sera-revisado-por-el-tribu
nal-constitucional.html (Chile).
244. C.P. art. 93, at 1 (Chile). This category, unprecedented in Chilean constitutional
history, was created by the 1980 Constitution. The Military Junta, as it lacked any
significant internal divisions on policy issues, had no problems putting in place legis-
lation regulating these matters. Once the democratic forces came to government in
1990, the supermajoritarian quorum and the preemptive review by the Constitu-
tional Tribunal sheltered the policy decisions that the Junta enshrined in the laws
from meaningful change.
245. Constitutional review of bills prior to their enactment is mandatory for organic con-
stitutional laws. C.P. art. 93 Nº 1 (Chile). Both organic constitutional laws and
ordinary statutes, however, can also be reviewed prior to their enactment when there
is a “question of constitutionality”—i.e., when a group of congressmen challenges
the constitutionality before the Tribunal. C.P. art. 93 Nº 3 (Chile).
246. Muñoz, supra note 201.
247. Nelly Yáñez N., Diputado Jorge Sabag se autodefine como “el último de los mohicanos”
en la DC: “Voy a recurrir al TC si la Cámara aprueba la pı́ldora”, EL MERCURIO, 12
julio 2009, at D6 (Chile).
248. HISTORIA DE LA LEY No. 20.418, supra note 234, at 74, 124, 232.
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the floor of the Lower House”; it was “the Constitution that commands us
to send it to the Court.”249
Why did none of the congressmen who had announced that they
would complain before the Court about the unconstitutionality of the
pill—Melero, Arancibia, Kast (UDI), Sabag (PDC)—make good on their
promises? Why did Álvarez make that announcement so quickly and pub-
licly through his Twitter account? The timing of these events seems impor-
tant. The legislative process was completed on January 6, 2010, and the bill
was sent for its preemptive constitutional review the next day.250 Very
shortly thereafter, on January 17, the presidential runoff between Sebastián
Piñera (RN) and Eduardo Frei (PDC) was held. It is very likely that both
candidates made strong efforts to silence any action that could be used
against them. If a Christian Democrat like Sabag had done anything, pro-
gressive critics of the Frei candidacy could have spoken against him in the
second round election. Certainly if congressmen in the Right had actively
objected to the bill’s constitutionality before the Tribunal it would have
damaged the moderate image that Piñera needed so much in order to be
elected. The way events unfolded suggests this political dynamic was at play.
A clear example is found in the case of Álvarez, who, as President of the
Chamber of Deputies, announced to the press that the bill would be sent to
the Constitutional Tribunal.251 Soon PPD congressmen claimed that, once
again, the UDI had called in the Tribunal.252 Álvarez even felt compelled to
rebuke the criticisms made by PPD congressman Felipe Harboe, telling him
through Twitter that “the pill project goes to the Court because it includes
an organic constitutional norm, not on a whim of mine.”253 Both Frei254
and President Bachelet255 called on congressmen to approve the bill.
249. Proyecto sobre pı́ldora del dı́a después va al TC tras su aprobación, EL MERCURIO, 1
enero 2010, at C2 (Chile). Rodrigo Álvarez, nonetheless, voted against the bill.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Tribunal Constitucional volverá a revisar proyecto de la “pı́ldora”, COOPERATIVA.CL (6
enero 2010, 2:36 PM), http://www.cooperativa.cl/noticias/pais/salud/pildora-del-
dia-despues/tribunal-constitucional-volvera-a-revisar-proyecto-de-la-pildora/2010-
01-06/144117.html (Chile).
253. Rodrigo Alvarez, TWITTER (6 enero 2010, 10:04 AM UTC), https://twitter.com/#!/
RodrigoAlvarez_/status/7448494839.
254. Frei emplaza a la oposición a “no boicotear” proyecto sobre la pı́ldora, EL MERCURIO
ONLINE (28 octubre 2009, 5:40 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2009/10/28/382237/frei-emplaza-a-la-oposicion-a-no-boicotear-proyecto-sobre-la-
pildora.html (Chile).
255. Bachelet pide apoyar distribución gratuita de pı́ldora del dı́a después, EL MERCURIO
ONLINE (28 octubre 2009, 1:04 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/
2009/10/28/382188/bachelet-pide-apoyar-distribucion-gratuita-de-pildora-del-dia-
despues.html (Chile).
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The bill was sent to the Tribunal on January 7, 2010. Its ruling was
issued shortly after, on January 14, in eight short paragraphs.256 The deci-
sion was formalistic and self-restrained. The Tribunal declared that the
Horvath amendment “regulates matters characteristic of organic constitu-
tional laws”;257 that “the norm of the bill reviewed by this Court was ap-
proved in both Chambers of the National Congress by the majorities
required by the second paragraph of Article 66 of the Constitution, and
that, in this regard, no question of constitutionality has been raised”;258 and
that it “does not comprise norms that conflict with the Constitution.”259 In
sum, the Tribunal concluded that the law was constitutional.
The six-justice majority that in 2008 declared the pill unconstitutional
splintered on this issue. Cea had already left the Tribunal. Venegas and Co-
lombo subscribed to a strict understanding of the Tribunal’s preemptive
review powers without further elaboration. Bertelsen and Peña joined in this
restrained approach, but included a natural law justification for their view
that the Horvath amendment was indeed constitutional. Only Fernández
Baeza voted against the constitutionality of the bill invoking the substantive
precedent of 2008.260 This outcome elicits various questions.
First, why did the Tribunal not declare the bill unconstitutional alto-
gether? That was a possible outcome. At least one Justice, Mario Fernán-
256. Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 14 enero 2010, “Control de
constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre información, orientación y prestaciones
en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” Rol de la causa: 1588–2010 (Chile).
257. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 6. Justices Vodanovic, Navarro, Francisco Fernández and Carmona, how-
ever, disagreed with this assertion, inspired by a restrained understanding of the
scope of constitutional organic laws. The Tribunal later articulated this perspective in
1992, asserting that constitutional organic laws “have been incorporated to the Con-
stitution restrictively and in a very exceptional way, to regulate certain basic institu-
tions with the purpose of giving stability to the system of governance and to avoid
the risk that accidental majorities can change it.” Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.]
[Constitutional Court], 30 noviembre 1992, “Requerimiento respecto de la cuestión
de constitucionalidad surgida durante la tramitación del proyecto de ley que
Modifica la Planta de Personal de la Contralorı́a General de la República,” Rol de la
causa: 160–1996, slip op. at § 9 (Chile).
258. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 7.
259. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 8.
260. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 7.
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dez,261 pointed out that the newly enacted legislation contradicted the
Tribunal’s 2008 decision. As he declared in his dissent, the Tribunal’s deci-
sion in Case No. 740 was based on a substantive assessment of the threat
that the pill presented to the embryo’s right to life. For Fernández, “the
constitutional review that this Tribunal has been called to perform in this
case deals with a matter about which the Tribunal already issued its juridical
opinion, in April 2008, and with respect to the subject and form of which there
has been no change at all.”262 Fernandez was the only activist voice on this
issue; an affiliate to the PDC and a former member of the Lagos cabinet, he
had already shown, in 2008, that he did not take into consideration partisan
strategy when it came to matters where the Church had strong stances.263
To the Justices close to the Right,—Venegas, Colombo, Bertelsen, and
Peña—things certainly looked different. The 2008 ruling taught them the
clear lesson that the pill was tainted with controversy. They might have
preferred not to be associated with it again. The timing was also particularly
critical. The 2009–2010 presidential elections looked like, and indeed be-
came, the moment when the Right would win the Presidency democrati-
cally for the first time in half a century.264 If there was a moment for
caution and self-restraint, it was certainly that one. After all, not going be-
yond its preemptive review mandate would not harm the Tribunal.
Second, why did the Tribunal decline to declare the Horvath amend-
ment unconstitutional on the basis of its lack of “direct connection with the
central or fundamental ideas of the bill”? It would seem that the strategic
commitments of its members pointed down other paths. They had no in-
centive to make such a declaration, even with the interests of the Right in
261. Fernández, a PDC appointee, was a staunch Catholic. In 2002 he declared: “I am
against divorce, because the Church is against divorce. I have no idea about the
theological reasons, I am not a theologian. I believe everything that the Cardinal
says. He is my religious authority.” Francisco Artaza, El voto que La Moneda no pudo
cambiar, LA TERCERA REPORTAJES, 8 abril 2008, at 12 (Chile).
262. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 7 (Fernández, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
263. Mario Fernández, a long-time member of the PDC, was appointed by President
Ricardo Lagos as his Minister of National Defense and then as his Minister Secre-
tary-General of the Presidency. At the time of the 2008 decision, Fernández was
strongly criticized by members of the Concertación. “Mario follows closely the
precepts of the Church,” said some of his fellow party members to El Mercurio,
which also reported that Fernández attends Mass every day. Vı́ctor Zúñiga, Fernán-
dez justifica su voto contra la distribución de pı́ldora en consultorios, EL MERCURIO (3
mayo 2008) (Chile).
264. Alexei Barrionuevo, Right-Wing Businessman Wins Chile’s Presidency, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/18/world/americas/18chile.html
?_r=0.
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mind. Annulling it would have meant leaving the bill as the President had
proposed it. Precedent pointed toward approval; the Tribunal often—but
not always—interprets its preemptive review powers as limited to merely the
review of whether the constitutionally required quorum was satisfied.
Justices Raúl Bertelsen and Marisol Peña nevertheless used the oppor-
tunity to imbue the Horvath amendment with natural law overtones. Justice
Bertelsen wrote that “the law, although it includes a new mandatory con-
tent for high school curriculums, . . . does not require [schools] to develop it
in a predetermined direction, but rather allows each educational institution
to do so according to its educational ideology, and thus respects the free-
dom of teaching constitutionally recognized in Article 19, No. 11, of our
Basic Law.”265 His words convey a libertarian view of education that, in
context, appears to be protective of religious education.266 Justice Peña, for
her part, argued that schools “do not enjoy an absolute liberty in that sense;
rather, the principles and values, convictions and beliefs that the school in
question holds in this matter must respect the constitutional limits that con-
strain freedom of teaching.”267 For Peña this meant that education must:
[G]ive an objective and responsible account of the current state
of the science and technology related to these matters, emphasiz-
ing the eventual assault on the right to life—the most basic and
fundamental among human rights—that the use of certain con-
traceptive methods can cause, as expressed in the decision taken
by this Court in its Case No. 740.268
265. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 4 (Bertelsen, J., concurring).
266. The most important elite schools are run by various religious orders, including the
Jesuits, the Opus Dei, the Legionaries of Christ, the Congregation of Holy Cross,
and the Society of the Divine Word. See ¿La elite nace o se hace?, CAPITAL (24 enero
2014), http://www.capital.cl/poder/la-elite-nace-o-se-hace/ (Chile). With respect to
subsidized private education, a study shows that by the year 2001, out of 3094 subsi-
dized schools whose information was available (in a total of 3594), there were 812
schools run directly or indirectly by churches, representing 26.6% of the institutions
and 35.6% of the students in the system. See MARCIAL MALDONADO TAPIA,
OFICINA REGIONAL DE LA INTERNACIONAL DE LA EDUCACIÓN PARA AMÉRICA LA-
TINA, LA PRIVATIZACIÓN DE LA EDUCACIÓN EN CHILE 55 (2003).
267. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 4 (Peña, J., concurring).
268. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at § 4 (Peña, J., concurring).
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In other words, Peña believed that freedom of teaching is not so free.
Schools must transmit a pro-life understanding of sexual education. Ber-
telsen and Peña diverge rhetorically in their stance towards freedom—one
defends it while the other constrains it—but they converge in the substance
of their concerns: the importance of reaffirming a Catholic sexual ethos,
whether it need protection from State intervention or enforcement against
non-Catholic actors.
On January 18, 2010 Michelle Bachelet signed Law No. 20.418, titled
“Rules About Information, Orientation, and Services Related to the Regula-
tion of Fertility”.269 On the day before, the Concertación candidate, Eduardo
Frei, lost the election against his competitor, and the days of the Center-Left
in government came to a halt.270 A few weeks later physician Jaime
Mañalich, appointed by Piñera to be his Minister of Health, announced to
the press that the distribution of the pill was not in danger.271
Consider the question of whether, as Justice Fernández contended, the
Presidency and Congress had engaged not only in an act of legal resistance
but of frank disobedience.272 Was Justice Fernández right? Was the 2008
ruling binding on the Presidency and Congress in the sense of forestalling a
bill legalizing the morning-after pill? It seems that he was not completely
right, considering that the Tribunal itself circumscribed its ruling to the
President’s Supreme Decree, seemingly to prevent it from affecting other
contraceptive methods and effectively leaving the pill’s administrative au-
thorization by the ISP untouched.273 The Tribunal, as a consequence, did
decide that the pill was unconstitutional for substantive reasons but it did
not take this judgment to its ultimate consequence, i.e., annulling the IPH
269. Law No. 20418, Enero 18, 2010, Fija Normas sobre Información, Orientación y
Prestaciones en materia de regulación de la Fertilidad, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.]
(Chile), available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idLey=20418&idVersion=2010-
01-28. The bill was ready for its enactment on January 14, but Rodrigo Álvarez
could not be found that day. La postergada promulgación de la ley sobre la “pı́ldora”,
EL MOSTRADOR (15 enero 2010), http://www.elmostrador.cl/pais/2010/01/15/la-
postergada-promulgacion-de-la-ley-sobre-la-pildora/ (Chile).
270. Barrionuevo, supra note 264.
271. Futuro Ministro de Salud: Habrá pı́ldora del dı́a después en todos los consultorios, EL
MERCURIO ONLINE (12 febrero 2010, 8:38 PM), http://www.emol.com/noticias/
nacional/2010/02/12/398323/futuro-ministro-de-salud-habra-pildora-del-dia-
despues-en-todos-los-consultorios.html (Chile).
272. T.C., 14 enero 2010, “Control de constitucionalidad del proyecto de ley sobre in-
formación, orientación y prestaciones en materia de regulación de la fertilidad,” slip
op. at §§ 8–12 (Fernández, J., dissenting).
273. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto
Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 740–2007, slip op. at
§ 40 (Chile).
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authorization. It was an inaction, however, that was consistent with the sep-
aration of powers enshrined in the Chilean Constitution, which does not
give the Constitutional Tribunal the authority to declare unconstitutional
administrative acts that no one has asked it to review. The Tribunal cannot
trigger constitutional review on its own; constitutional review must begin
upon request by the appropriate person or office.274 Thus, it was the anti-
pill litigants who failed to bring their legal mobilization to its ultimate de-
sired consequence. Kast and the other congressmen who had announced
they would request the Tribunal’s intervention failed to follow through. In
the face of this inaction, Decision Nº 740 of the Chilean Constitutional
Tribunal can be characterized not only as the most controversial ruling in
the court’s history, but also as its most ineffective.
The ineffectiveness of that ruling, to be sure, is not necessarily a bad
thing. In the context of American constitutional debates, Robert Post and
Reva Siegel have argued that “[t]rust in the responsiveness of the constitu-
tional order plays a crucial role in preserving the Constitution’s authority,”
a trust whose maintenance “depends upon citizens having meaningful op-
portunities to persuade each other to adopt alternative constitutional under-
standings.”275 We can assess the final outcome of the struggles around the
legality of the morning-after pill from that perspective. In the end, the Tri-
bunal did not insist on its previous and unpopular decision appears, from
this perspective, as an effort to restore trust in the responsiveness of the
constitutional order.
CONCLUSION: ANSWERING A FEW QUESTIONS
What accounts for the emergence and success of this instance of legal
mobilization? Is this a case comparable to the conservative legal movement
described by Teles in the United States? And what seems to be the future of
reproductive rights in this part of the world?
First, why did these advocates take to the courts? In the first phase
from 2001 to 2008, the pill was backed by administrative action. Through-
out this period Socialists who unequivocally supported the distribution of
the morning-after pill held the Presidency. However, during that time it was
unclear what position the Centrist and Center-Right congressmen of the
Christian Democrat and National Renewal parties would take. This ambi-
guity meant that the opponents of the pill could not know whether they
could count on legislative support to ban the pill through legislation. Fur-
thermore, this avenue would have been complicated by the Chilean legisla-
274. C.P. art. 93 (Chile).
275. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020 25, at 27 (Jack Balkin & Reva Siegel eds., 2009).
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tive process, which gives the President substantial control of the legislative
agenda.276 Bills proposed by congressmen that are not sponsored at some
point by the Executive are rarely discussed and almost never approved.277 In
consequence, in this phase, their safest option was judicial review. By the
time that a legislative proposal finally arrived in Congress in the second
phase, it was clear that a majority of Chileans were in favor, making it hard
for the anti-pill coalition to oppose it.278
Second, why were the anti-pill advocates so successful in the courts?
To put it simply, the natural law constitutional text, read through the lenses
of the old “positivistic” legal culture, seems to have tilted the legal field in
favor of their position. Protecting reproductive autonomy, in the context of
a natural law constitutional text, would require forms of purposive reason-
ing that remain unavailable to Chilean judges. The only option they have is
to use formalistic evasions to avoid deciding the issues. Moreover, because
judges have been excluded from policymaking through the interdiction of
stare decisis, they are wary of taking positions that could create new constitu-
tional rights through adjudication.
Finally, what is the future of reproductive rights in Chile? Let us re-
member that, in its much-criticized decision No. 740, the Constitutional
Tribunal never discussed reproductive rights, neither from the perspective of
women’s autonomy nor from the perspective of public health. Rather it
limited itself to discussing either positivistic worries about hierarchies of
norms or natural law concerns regarding the unborn.279 These preferences
and omissions spoke loudly about the current state of a historically formalis-
tic legal culture that has only relatively recently been impressed by Catholic
natural law. It seems unlikely that a widespread awareness of gender issues
would emerge from within this legal culture. To be sure, there are important
voices in academia that seek to change this. Feminist and gender legal schol-
ars such as Lidia Casas, Yanira Zúñiga, Verónica Undurraga, and Alejandra
Zúñiga have full-time appointments at prestigious universities and regularly
publish works that reflect these perspectives. However, so far law school
curricula and the opinions of judges, arguably the two most important
sources of internal legal culture, do not seem to have taken notice of gender
perspectives and concerns.
276. Siavelis, supra note 47, at 83–84.
277. Id. at 84–89.
278. See, e.g., CORPORACIÓN HUMANAS, V ENCUESTA NACIONAL: PERCEPCIONES DE LAS
MUJERES SOBRE SU SITUACIÓN Y CONDICIONES DE VIDA EN CHILE 53 (2008).
279. Tribunal Constitucional (T.C.) (Constitutional Court) (highest court on constitu-
tional matters), 18 abril 2008, “Requerimiento de inconstitucionalidad del Decreto
Supremo N° 48 del Ministerio de Salud,” Rol de la causa: 740–2007, slip op. at
§ 40 (Chile).
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It seems that if a change in constitutional culture with respect to re-
productive rights is ever to take place, it will have to come from the external
legal culture—from the preferences and demands of public opinion and
social movements. On this front, there is cause for optimism. An important
element in the landscape that needs to be taken into account is the de-
mand—put forward by the 2011 student protests and embraced by
Michelle Bachelet as a key element of her new term as President—of enact-
ing a new Constitution. This event, if it takes place, will most likely redraw
the foundation of Chilean constitutional law, and replace its natural law
and neoliberal influences with declarations of autonomy, equality and social
rights.280
Even if there is no new Constitution, cultural transformations might
change the contents of legislation with respect to reproductive rights, partic-
ularly with regard to abortion. The evolution of public opinion in this re-
spect in the last three decades makes this scenario appear plausible. In 1987,
a poll registered 81.8 % disagreement with the following question: “Are you
in agreement or in disagreement with the idea of enacting a law authorizing
abortion in Chile?”281 In 1999, another poll showed that 55% of Chileans
surveyed believed that abortion should always be prohibited, 34.7% stated
that abortion should be allowed in special cases, and 9.6% asserted that
abortion should be freely available to women.282 A 2010 poll concluded that
in the case of a rape, only 40.8% believed that abortion should still be
prohibited, against 53.4% who believed that in the case of rape abortion
should be allowed.283 The same poll showed that when the pregnancy causes
a serious threat to the life of the mother, 40.5% would uphold the ban and
53.1% would overturn it.284 These numbers suggest that Chileans are in-
creasingly making distinctions on this issue; they seem to value the life of
the unborn, but when the life or the autonomy of the woman is threatened
in a way they deem excessive, they tend to defer to the latter. Also, these
280. Fernando Muñoz León, The Constituent Power of Student Protests in Chile, INT’L J.
CONST. L. & CONSTITUTIONMAKING.ORG BLOG (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www
.iconnectblog.com/2013/08/the-constituent-power-of-student-protests-in-chile.
281. Estudio Social y de Opinión Pública en la población de Santiago, Diciembre 1986 -
Enero 1987, CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS 111 (1987), available at http://www
.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_2949_2623/DOCUMENTO_encDic86_1.pdf (Chile).
282. Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública, Septiembre-Octubre 1999, CENTRO DE ES-
TUDIOS PÚBLICOS 36 (1999), available at http://www.cepchile.cl/1_2906/doc/es-
tudio_nacional_de_opinion_publica_septiembre-octubre_1999
.html#.UuGhMRAo7IV (Chile).
283. Encuesta Nacional UDP 2010: Ciudadanı́a apoya aborto dependiendo de circunstancias;
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numbers suggest that the Chilean attitude toward abortion continues to
evolve.285 Such as in the case of the morning-after pill, cultural change
seems to be at work—and the passage of time appears to be the strongest
ally of progress in the field of reproductive rights in Chile.
The protracted struggle around the morning-after pill ultimately en-
ded with a victory for reproductive rights. Whether this decade of social,
political, and legal conflict served to advance the cause of sexual autonomy
is still open to debate. While now Chileans have access to this drug, the
total ban on abortion was left unchallenged. Has the exposure of reproduc-
tion issues for a decade paved the road for confronting this more complex
issue? The next decade of reproductive rights struggles will answer this
question.
285. Obviously, the question asked in the first poll makes it impossible to know whether
Chileans would have made similar distinctions at that time. However, the fact that
polls have become more and more subtle on this issue reveals in itself a change in the
way that the issue is approached by Chilean society: from blunt rejection to thought-
ful consideration.

